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This dissertation improves upon past understanding of politics, religion, and 
nature through a close exploration of the role Christian theology plays in opinion 
formation. It does so by probing the varieties of religiously motivated environmental 
stewardship and religious attitudes towards anthropogenic changes of nature. The 
dissertation also develops new methodological tools to better understand the role of 
faith during the Anthropocene.  
The study employs a mixed-method approach which compares analysis of 
denominational proclamations about global warming with in-person clergy interviews 
and survey data collected from two American heartland states. The survey data 
primarily focuses on climate change, with genetically modified organisms as an 
additional example of humans altering the natural order. Unique to this dissertation 
are new measurements of Christian theologies about the human relationship with the 
created order, which clarify an enduring debate over religion and the environment.  
In particular, theology encouraging dominion over nature has almost vanished 
from religious consciousness. Instead, the key theological distinction is between 
stewardship as resource management and stewardship as preservation. These 
theological distinctions help explain acceptance or resistance to anthropogenic 
changes to nature and they illuminate important differences in policy preferences 
around climate change, global warming, and other science-driven policy areas. 
 




Chapter 1 : Introduction 
“And God said: who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it 
had issued out of the womb? Who hath divided a watercourse for the 
overflowing waters, or a way for the lightning of thunder; To cause it to rain 
on the earth, where no man is; on the wilderness, wherein there is no man? 
 
And man said: I did, actually” 
(Davies 2016, 40) 
 
Introduction: 
 What is the relationship between humanity and nature? How does religion 
conceptualize this relationship? What does this mean for politics and public policy? 
Over the course of the next few pages, I offer answers to these questions. Using a 
targeted study of a highly religious American state, I explore how religious 
individuals and organizations view the relationship between humanity and nature and 
how this spills over into scientific policy issues areas, such as environmental policy 
and climate change along with more practical matters such as responses to natural 
disaster.  
At the heart of this project is a test of the claim that some religious groups 
oppose claims about climate change mitigation and certain environmental policy 
actions because of theological reasons. Yet, the imprint of human activity on the earth 
is hard to deny even in regional contexts. Farming practices in the plains states 
amplified the impacts of severe drought in the 1930s and ravaged agrarian states such 
as Oklahoma others in the American Great Plains and Canadians Prairies (McLeman 
et al. 2014; Cook, Miller, and Seager 2009). In the wake of catastrophic flooding in 




Louisiana following hurricane Katrina in 2005, disaster researchers found that the 
leaves designed to prevent flooding may have actually made the situation worse by 
trapping water in the city and eroding the wetlands that historically protected the 
Mississippi Delta (Van Heerden 2007). More recently, researchers have tracked a 
definitive correlation between the resource extraction technique of hydrolytic 
fracturing and the rise of earthquakes in states not known to have active fault-lines. In 
2015, Oklahoma overtook California as the most earthquake prone state in the United 
States (Wines 2016; “USGS Earthquakes” 2016; “Earthquakes in Oklahoma” 2016). 
Whether theology allows for it or not, human impacts on nature are evident. 
Thinking about the role of theology on environmental policy from a slightly 
different angle, the religious objection or support for scientific claims about climate 
and environment stem from how that religion conceptualizes the ability of humans to 
shape or reshape the earth. This conceptualization of the relationship between 
humanity and nature as informed by religious thinking can be thought of as a 
theology of nature. Rephrased as questions: do the adherents of a specific religious 
tradition believe that humans have creative or destructive power over the earth? What 
is the scope of that power, and what religious justifications support these opinions? 
Furthermore, do these religious adherents believe public policy makers should 
assume that humanity has entered the Anthropocene and direct political resources at 
solving environmental problems?  
To answer these questions, it is useful to define key terms and approaches 
towards the study of religion and environmentalism. The Anthropocene describes the 




era in human history where humanity began to alter the natural world in a significant 
manner. The term was created to mark a departure from what the International 
Geological Congresses called the Holocene, or “the recent whole”, as adopted in 1865 
to describe the past ten-thousand years or so of human history. The “Anthropocene 
suggests that…human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they 
rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing the Earth into planetary terra 
incognita. The Earth is rapidly moving into a less biologically diverse, less forested, 
much warmer, and probably wetter and stormier state” (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 
2007). In other words, humans have gained agency over nature and are now able to 
affect major change in the natural world. 
 Proponents of the term often connect the beginning of the Anthropocene to 
the start of the industrial era when humans began the large scale use of fossil fuels 
such as coal and oil, somewhere in the 1800s (Crutzen 2002; Steffen, Crutzen, and 
McNeill 2007). As such, human impact on nature is often measured though the 
emission of carbon and other gases into the atmosphere and rising global 
temperatures as researchers strive to monitor anthropogenic climate change (“Climate 
Change 2014: Synthesis Report” 2014).  
The claim that humans are causing global warming and climate change 
through their actions has reached scientific consensus but remains a deeply divisive 
issue with political and policy consequences among the American public. I argue that 
one reason for this divisiveness centers on religious understandings about the 
relationship between humans and the natural world. In essence, theology matters. 




Building on this claim, I look at three levels of religious influence; organizational, 
clergy elites, and mass publics, to evaluate how religious belief influences attitudes 
towards scientific policy issue areas like climate change and global warming 
mitigation. 
Theologians and philosophers have explored how religious traditions 
approach nature and the climate. These approaches have ranged from historical 
examinations of how religions have written and spoken about nature to more activist 
statements of how religious groups should approach the environment.  Some of these, 
such as Pope Francis’s Laudato Si, have been received well, while others, such as 
Richard Cizick’s statement on behalf of the National Association of Evangelicals 
were roundly rejected by the communities they claimed to represent. Survey evidence 
after the release of Laudato Si suggests a “Francis Bump” in Catholic acceptance of 
global warming and climate change (Maibach et al. 2015). Additionally, Laudato Si 
was adapted and abridged by the United States Council of Catholic Bishops into 
resources for study by local congregations (“Environment and Environmental Justice 
Program” 2017). Richard Cizick, on the other hand, was run out of the NAE due, in 
part, to his comments on climate change, and NAE statements accepting climate 
change are opposed by other high-profile evangelical leaders and associations 
(Pulliam 2008). What accounts for these differences in response to claims about 
climate change? Why might religious adherents support or oppose their religious 
leaders expressing belief that the earth is warming and humans may be at blame? I 
argue that one of the key reasons is the relationships between humans and the 




environment as expressed in theologies of nature. Yet, theology as an explanation is 
not the only approach social scientists have used to understand the relationship 
between environment and religion. 
From a social science angle, scholars have sought to understand how religious 
believers approach nature and climate. These inquiries have ranged from views on 
science (Roos 2014; Ding et al. 2011), to trust in scientists (Evans 2013; Evans and 
Evans 2008), to specific policy proposals about environmental policy such as 
recycling or international climate treaties. More specific to political science, scholars 
have historically approached religion from an affiliation perspective and have used 
church membership to predict attitudes about climate (Eckberg and Blocker 1989). 
More recent approaches have attempted to get at religious belief systems about nature 
and how that might influence environmental policy attitudes (Guth et al. 1995). 
Scholars have also explored the power of networks on congregations and the ability 
of religious elites to shape attitudes (Djupe and Hunt 2009). 
Yet, why does this matter for policy makers or political scientists? Several 
reasons standout. First, demographically, while religious identification in the United 
States has been somewhat on the decline and accentuated by the rapid rise of the 
“nones”, those who identify as religious remains high in the United States.1 While the 
                                                            
1 Religious “nones” are typically defined as individuals who identify as atheist, 
agnostic, or with no religion (“‘Nones’ on the Rise” 2012; Kosmin et al. 2009). The 
reason for the rise of “nones” remains debated and is attributed to growing 
secularism, changes in survey methods, or the realignment of traditional 
denominations and religious categories (Gutterman and Murphy 2016). Surveys 




numbers vary across researchers, around 80% of Americans identify with a religious 
faith of some sort and nearly 70% are explicitly Christian (“America’s Changing 
Religious Landscape” 2015). This places the United States well ahead of other 
comparable nations, especially when ranked in terms of environmental impact. Due to 
the nature of American democracy, this means that religious believers will continue 
to be a critical part the policy process though membership in the bureaucratic 
apparatus, as elected officials, as lobbyists and interest groups members, and as key 
political constituencies.  
Second, religious opinion on environmental policy, or scientific issues for that 
matter, is highly heterogeneous. Even though roughly 70% of Americans are 
Christian, there is considerable difference between and within the various factions of 
Christianity on how they approach politics and political engagement. Differences are 
also seen when religious believers are asked about their trust in science, scientists, 
and the ability of science to modify and improve the natural world. Better 
understanding of these differences will enhance the ability of policy makers and 
scholars to understand the political motivations of religious Americans. Religion 
shapes public opinion in ways that matter for a range of scientific policy issues that 
span from climate change, to genetically modified organisms, or manipulating human 
DNA. 
                                                            
estimate that around 20% of Americans are “nones” (“A Closer Look at America’s 
Rapidly Growing Religious ‘Nones’” 2015) . 




Third, adding concern over religious influences in politics allows for further 
testing of political science theories on mass opinion and behavior. How sensitive are 
religious individuals to cueing from their religious leaders or interest groups (Bullock 
2011; Gilens and Page 2014; Hetherington 2001)? How much does political ideology 
matter when religion and science conflict over an issue (A. Campbell et al. 1960; 
Bafumi and Shapiro 2009)?   Does religion provide individuals with a coherent 
worldview or is it just another layer in the bucket from which they draw random 
opinions (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992)? Studying religion in the context of politics 
provides a way to understand better the political motivations of citizens and their 
orientation towards society along with testing theories of politics. 
In this specific dissertation, I ask, what accounts for religious believers’ 
variety of opinion about climate change and environmental policy issues? I propose 
that an answer can be found in theology. Specifically, I contend that theologies of 
nature can cut across religious communities and political loyalties to increase support 
or opposition to politicized issues such as climate change. Theologies of nature 
contain coherent stories, or accounts, of creation and destruction. They identify the 
relationship between humanity and the divine, humanity and nature, and hint at the 
limits of human creativity. Similar to other cultural worldviews or political 
ideologies, theologies of nature serve as the scaffolding for a political framework 
upon which individuals build their political identities, attitudes, and opinions. 
 




Surveying the Landscape: 
The conversation on religion and environment often begins in the present. 
Near to the time of the writing of this dissertation, Congress member Tim Walberg, a 
Republican and Christian went on record stating “I believe there’s been climate 
change since the beginning of time. I believe there are cycles. Do I think man has 
some impact? Yeah, of course. Can man change the entire universe? No….Why do I 
believe that?...Well, as a Christian, I believe that there is a creator in God who is 
much bigger than us. And I’m confident that, if there’s a real problem, he can take 
care of it” (Gajanan 2017). This statement is not that dissimilar from the infamous 
quote, among many, by James Watt during the 1980s. Watt, a Pentecostal Christian, 
served as Secretary for the Interior under President Ronald Reagan when he testified 
before Congress in 1981 saying “I do not know how many future generations we can 
count on before the Lord returns" as a basis for caution against future environmental 
planning (Martin 1982; Guth et al. 1993). Both leaders shared a common faith 
through Evangelical Christianity and provide face validation for Lynn White’s claims 
that Protestant Christian thought leads to low environmentalism. However, the history 
of religion and American environmentalism is far more nuanced and complicated.  
During these same few decades, Christians from the similar Protestant 
traditions as Walberg and Watt began to sound the alarm on global warming, 
pollution, and climate change. Earth Day has roots in the Pentecostal turned Lutheran 
preacher, John McConnell Jr., who felt that it would be “’a more  Christ-like  view  
be  to recognize Earth as a precious gift that is our responsibility to protect and 




nurture’” than to believe the “’earth will soon pass away’” (Sparks and Rodgers 2010, 
24). McConnell Jr. stared Earth Day in California in the late 1960s and the idea went 
national when Senator Gaylord Nelson moved Earth Day from the spring equinox to 
April 22nd (Sparks and Rodgers 2010; Bailey 2011).  McConnell was not pioneering a 
radical new position for Christians in America regarding environmental preservation. 
Rather, he was following path that had been cleared a century before him. 
Historians note that the American environmental movement owes its genesis, 
at least in part, to the deep spirituality of early American Puritans. Traced separately 
by Mark Stoll and Evan Berry, American Puritans found knowledge of God in two 
books, the Bible and nature. Beginning with John Calvin, Stoll notes that Calvinism, 
which informed early American Puritans, carried a rich heritage of seeking God 
through Calvin’s “two means”. Stoll quotes Calvin, “we know [God] by two means: 
first, by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, which is before 
our eyes as a most elegant book…Secondly….by his holy and divine Word’” (Stoll 
2015, 42). Calvin’s teaching influenced early American preachers from Cotton 
Mather to Johnathan Edwards and was felt in the creation of Congregational and 
Presbyterian churches as the New England Puritan movement faded. 
Yet, it is from this New England Puritan heritage that early American 
conservationists and natural scientists created the east coast forestry schools at Yale 
and Columbia and then sojourn to the American West. In their trail, pioneers like 
Gifford Pinchot, Fredrick Law Olmstead, Katherine Lee Bates, John Muir, left behind 
municipal public parks, the National Park Service, the American conservation 




movement, and the religious and intellectual foundations for future environmental 
efforts (Stoll 2015). Both Stoll and Barry observe a decline in religious influence as 
American conservationism moved from its inception in the later 1800s into more 
professionalization in the early 1900s during the Progressive Era.(Stoll 2015; Berry 
2015). Yet, religion is not silent during this time and Protestant Christians rally 
behind efforts to expand national parks and to create auxiliary groups like the Sierra 
Club (Berry 2015). It is from these theological and intellectual roots that McConnell 
Jr. later draws on to begin Earth Day. It is from these same roots that Katheryn 
Hayhoe, a prominent member of the IPCC, began touring the country speaking to 
religious congregations about how her Christian faith informs her study of climate 
change and why Christians should care about the issue (Hayhoe and Farley 2009). In 
the current political climate, these theological roots have born the fruit of various 
advocacy networks for religiously inspired environmentalism (Interfaith Power and 
Light, Evangelical Environmental Network) or groups that fear an overemphasis on 
creation has distracted the faithful from their true religious purpose (Cornwall 
Alliance). 
Protestants are not alone in drawing from theological roots to explore 
environmental action. Pope Francis of the Catholic Church issued an encyclical titled: 
Laudato Si: Care for Our Common Home. In the letter, the Pope builds on the 
teachings about nature from Saint Francis of Assis, his namesake, and Catholic social 
teachings to encourage Catholics around the world into environmentalism as both 
preservation of God’s creation and to care for those vulnerable to potential impacts 




from climate change (Francis 2015). The theological history of the environmental 
teachings of the Catholic Church are explored further here since the dissertation will 
mostly focus on Protestants for reasons explained later. However, the story of historic 
Protestant and Catholic environmentalism help to illustrate the theological roots of 
American environmentalism.  
 
Searching for Religion in Political Opinion:  
To test the political implication of theologies of nature, I embark primarily on 
a study of climate change opinion among religious respondents. Broadly speaking, I 
ask, in what way does theology influence public opinion about policy issue areas 
concerning anthropogenic changes to nature? This leads to a narrower question 
asking how does theology inform climate change opinion and perceptions of risk 
from climate change? Extending the Anthropocene beyond just the environment, I 
also briefly ask how does theology influence attitudes on similar issues of 
anthropogenic change such as genetic modification? 
I compare the results against existing approaches to religion and public 
opinion through the following arguments. First, it is widely held that religious 
belonging, belief, or behavior predicts opinion on climate change, scientific policy, 
and political preferences in general. This approach uses self-identified responses on 
surveys to locate a respondent in a particular religious tradition, check for 
fundamentalist beliefs, and measure how often they practice their religion. Typical 
questions in this approach include “what is your religious preference?”, “are you 




born-again or evangelical?”, and “how often do you attend church?” The measures 
have proven robust and highly useful and are included on many surveys (Wald et al. 
1998; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Mockabee, Wald, and Leege 2007; Kellstedt, 
Wald, and Leege 1990). Yet, while this approach allows for questions on belief, such 
as those that would indicate theological orientations, the role of deep belief systems is 
underutilized.  
A second approach argues that religious culture and context are just as 
determinative as the three-Bs of believing, behaving, and belonging. Religious 
respondents are thought to be especially sensitive to the influences of those in their 
congregations and from religious leaders. In terms of culture, scholars have found 
within religious groups a simple divide of communitarianism versus individualism. 
This divide is manifest between denominations, such as Mainline Protestants and 
Evangelical Protestants, within denominations, and even within congregations. 
Considering context, scholars have found that factions within congregations can 
shape the political preferences of their fellow co-religionists. This pressure can come 
from peer groups or religious elites (Djupe and Hunt 2009; Djupe and Olson 2010; 
Djupe and Calfano 2013). Furthermore, religious elites are not exempt from being 
influenced by their peer groups or leaders (Calfano, Oldmixon, and Suiter 2014; 
Calfano, Oldmixon, and Suiter 2013). 
Between these two main approaches lie methodological differences. Those 
looking at culture and context tend to employ more experimental research designs 
while those using the three-Bs employ traditional survey methods. This divide may be 




the result of research preference rather than some deep methodological divide, as 
there is no reason one could not use experimental designs with elements of the three-
Bs. 
The final premise is built on the theory that I suggest. This study shows that 
theology shapes public opinion about climate change, its causes and impacts, and the 
trustworthiness of information about climate change. This is because climate change 
is a scientific issue that directly confronts theological claims about relationship 
between humanity and nature. In the Christian context, notions that humans can 
change the environment may directly challenge the narratives of the books of Genesis 
and Revelation where the Christian God was the sole creative and destructive power. 
Because of the deontological challenge brought by climate change to religious 
believers, I expect that theology matters in a powerful manner and similar to other 
deep belief systems such as political ideology. Using the analysis of surveys, written 
documents, and conversation, I show that opinions on scripture and perspectives on 
the relationship between humanity and nature are interrelated and suggest a semi-
coherent theological framework used by some religious adherents to inform their 
opinion about climate change, global warming, or other environmental issues. 
Generally, previous literature suggests there are frameworks which Christians 
might use when constructing beliefs about the environment: one of stewardship and 
one of dominion (White 1967; R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2014). 
Dominion suggests that after God created the earth humanity was give rule and 
dominion over all created things. As Lynn White argues, this led to a resource 




approach towards nature whereby all created things were at the disposal of humanity 
(White 1967). This narrative combines with other theological elements linked to 
biblical literalism, such as creationism and dispensational eschatology, to reinforce a 
view that God created nature for human use (Guth et al. 1993).  
Briefly defined, creationism is based on a very literal reading of the early 
chapters of Genesis, the first book of the Bible. In this narrative, God creates the 
earth, flora and fauna, animals and other living things. Finally, humans are created 
and placed into an idyllic setting called the Garden of Eden and given the command 
from God to, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule 
over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that 
moves on the ground” (Genesis 1:28). Yet, humans are separated and removed from 
the Garden by God after committing the first sin (Genesis 1-3). Dispensational 
eschatology continues a literal reading of Christian scripture with a special emphasis 
on chronology and periods of time called dispensations ending with the return of 
humans to an idyllic, Garden-like place, after God passes judgement on humanity for 
sin. There is tremendous variation in the specifics of this narrative, but key for the 
dissertation, is the possibility that God destroys or remakes the earth in the process of 
restoring the relationship between humanity and God. Note passages from scripture 
such as Revelation 8:7 where the text reads, “A third of the earth was burned up, a 
third of the trees were burned up, and all the green grass was burned up,” and 
Revelation 21:1 in which the narrator of Revelation says, “Then I saw ‘a new heaven 
and a new earth,’ for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there 




was no longer any sea.” Taken together, these narratives present a case for a 
dominion approach over nature by humans. 
A stewardship approach bases its theology of nature on a pre-Genesis 3 
perspective. While sin has consequences, humanity should focus on living up to the 
ideals found in a pre-sin world. As such, nature is not a mere resource but a creation 
to be cared for by humanity on behalf of God. While not explicit in giving humanity 
more agency, this view allows that human actions have more meaningful 
consequence. This view is closely linked to classical progressive and social gospel 
movements which have an eschatology that stresses human actions to help realize the 
kingdom of God on earth, or as close as possible before God eventually restores the 
earth and humanity. 
Applying these methods of studying religion and environmental policy to this 
dissertation, I have the general expectation that literalists will generally deny climate 
change and reject that it could be anthropogenic. That is, since only God can create 
and destroy, no action of humanity could cause or mitigate climate change, if it is 
occurring. It is expected that Christian non-literalists will generally accept climate 
change and accept that it could be anthropogenic. Other approaches have already 
shown sensitivity to worldview and its impacts on climate policy. For example, New 
Environmental Paradigm and Cultural Theory, widely used in climate studies, have 
good measures about approaches to nature (Dunlap et al. 2000a; Dunlap and Van 
Liere 2008; Dunlap 2008; Goebbert et al. 2012). However, religion has not yet been 
studied in the same manner. 




In anticipating critiques, several things must be explored. For one, it may be 
unclear when theology is activated versus other known influences on public opinion 
such as partisanship, media and agenda setting effects, and so on. Part of this project 
will try to uncover the depth of theology and where it might fit in relation to these 
other influences. Turning towards the known influence of the three-Bs, I place 
theology over and against other forms of religious adherence and religiosity when 
studying scientific policy issues such as climate change. Based on exploratory 
research, I suspect that theology will cut across belonging and behavior, though it will 
be harder to disentangle theology from belief. This may be a measurement issue, but, 
I suspect that beliefs, which in climate studies have been treated independently, group 
into patterns that are well explained from a theological perspective. At the very least, 
this dissertation will show that belief should be elevated above behavior and 
belonging in the three-Bs approach with respect to anthropogenic climate change and 
similar scientific policy issue areas.  
A second issue is what other religious and identity issues might explain 
opinion on climate change. For example, using a culture approach, high individualists 
may be less likely to believe in climate change while communitarians would accept 
the evidence of climatologists. However, I suggest that some of this could be 
explained by a deep view of theology. For example, literalists, who tend to be more 
individualistic, are less trusting of scientists in this case as climatological evidence is 
contrary to their theology of nature.  




Nevertheless, by looking within denominations in statistical or qualitative 
research, I believe that differences will emerge that are explained by theology. For 
example, I expect that non-literalist evangelicals will push against their context of 
evangelical churches and agree that climate change is occurring. In this case, context 
matters and may color the view of climate, but a respondent’s theological orientation 
will drive their base assumptions. 
In sum, a respondent’s faith is not merely shaped by the congregation they 
attend or how often they pray but it is also part of a deep and coherent belief system 
that operates widely across all issue areas. Though shaped by their interactions with 
their community, theological systems can help a respondent adopt or reject 
information on climate change, its causes, and its implications. 
 
Locating Religion and Politics: 
The study of religion and politics stands at crossroads. As survey work shows 
an increasing number of Americans opting to self-identify as “non-denominational”, 
“independent”, or “none”, traditional ways of treating religion in political science 
may not be fit for the task of exploring the relationship between faith and politics in 
the twenty-first century (“America’s Changing Religious Landscape” 2015; Schwadel 
2013).  Longstanding categories of religious affiliation are now more permeable as 
individuals and groups move between and across religious denominations. Even 
relatively unified denominations, like Episcopalians in the Christian Tradition, are 
beginning to see divisions forming over theological liberalism or conservatism and 




splits into Episcopalian/liberal and Anglican/conservative wings. The 2016 
suspension of American Episcopalians from the Global Anglican Community stands 
as an example (Winston 2016). What this suggests is that focusing on theological 
orientation rather than religious affiliation may help in the exploration of religion and 
politics during this time of religious realignment. 
The study of religion in the context of public opinion has seen four major 
approaches. The ethnoreligious approach looks at the influence of religious group 
identity on political decisions. In response to shifts within American culture, the 
second approach focuses on the restructuring of American religion and culture to 
values politics. The third approach is summarized by the “Three-Bs” of belonging, 
behavior, and belief. A fourth emerging approach examines religion using 
experimental methods and draws on both social network theory and political 
psychology. Of the four, the three-Bs is certainly the dominant approach. The 
following section will look at each approach in turn. 
The ethnoreligious approach leans heavily on early sociologists. Emile 
Durkheim situated individuals within their respective groups which informed 
individual engagement in politics. Scholars of the United States found strong group 
identities and affinities by region, party, and religion (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 
2014). This group identity still functions, in part, when religious groups feel 
threatened (D. E. Campbell 2006; Layman and Carmines 1997; Carsey and Layman 
2006; Leege et al. 2002). McTague and Layman (2009) argue that in studies prior the 
1980s, strong evidence was seen that religious affiliation mattered and individuals 




tended to stay aligned with their group identification (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Sundquist 1983; McCormick 1974; Green 2007).  
Alternatively, the restructuring approach situates individuals outside their 
ethnoreligious group. This approach has roots in Max Weber and is expressed in 
contemporary American scholarship through the ideas of sorting and culture wars. 
Due to the ability of Americans to move between previously static geographical, 
social, and religious borders, religious identity is less tied to ethnically defined groups 
and more to group self-selection. Summarizing arguments from Nancy Ammerman 
(1987), James Davidson Hunter (1992), and Robert Wuthnow (1987), Smidt et al 
(2009), they define this approach as viewing individuals and religious groups on a 
traditionalist-modernist spectrum into which individuals self-select. This works 
similar to the concept of sorting in voting behavior studies. Beyond just selecting 
neighborhoods, individuals now choose churches that match their preexisting belief 
structures increasing the likeliness of echo chambers and providing and explanation 
to both the rise of suburban mega-churches and congregational gentrification. 
Around the 1980s theological restructuring began happening within 
Evangelical churches and later within other Christian traditions resulting in strong 
within group differences based on belief and behavior. “Contemporary political 
behavior, however, is not defined entirely by the traditionalist-modernist divide, 
because there remain noticeable discrepancies in vote choice and party ties between 
religious traditions” (McTague and Layman 2009, 334). In their search for how, why, 
and when, McTague and Layman argue that political activists were able to politicize 




religious cleavages to the advantage of the GOP. Yet, it is entirely possible that there 
is sorting taking place within denominations and affiliations and the findings that 
affiliation matter is a second-order effect of theological realignment. That is, people 
have moved denominations due to doctrinal and theological preferences. 
The ethnoreligious and restructuring approaches were foundational to the 
emergence of a third approach commonly known as the three-Bs. Building on the 
cleavages that surfaced during restructuring, this approach examines religious 
belonging, behavior, and belief through public opinion surveys. The approach was 
easily incorporated into large national surveys and has been alternatively called the 
religious commitment approach (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown 2014; Djupe and Calfano 2013).  
Digging a little deeper, belonging considers the religious tradition, family, and 
denomination or congregation with which members of religious commitment identify. 
Religious tradition contains major world religions along with major divisions within 
those religions. For example, Christianity is broken out into Catholic, Mainline 
Protestant, and Evangelical Protestant. Many studies now also add ethnic/racial 
divisions of Hispanic Catholic or Black Protestant. Families consist of groups or 
denominations united by common histories, such as Baptist or Methodist. Families 
can be further subdivided into specific denominations and congregations, such as 
Southern Baptists or Free-Will Baptists. These breaks occur over specific doctrinal 
differences or denominationally allegiances. Believing looks at the doctrinal 




affirmations of religious individuals. These questions grew in popularity following 
the rise of neo-fundamentalism and evangelicals in the middle of the 1900s.  
Key questions center on beliefs about biblical literalism, born again 
experience, and other specific doctrines. Behavior considers the actions of religious 
believers. Similar to other behavior style studies, these surveys ask about how often 
religious believers perform religious actions. Key questions center on how often one 
attends religious services, reads sacred texts, or prays (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 
2009; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014).  
Not entirely satisfied with the methodology and assumptions inherent in the 
three-Bs, an emerging fourth approach emphasizes experimental methods (Djupe and 
Calfano 2013).  Paul Djupe, Brian Calfano, and other others, broadly argue that the 
inclusion of experimental methodology into existing approaches will improve the 
power of studies on religion and politics. However, they move away from three-B 
style surveys and towards social network analysis of congregations and groups of 
believers or splice innovations in political psychology with religion and politics. 
Above all, the method of choice is experimental. This approach is the least developed 
of the four discussed and related to the elite-cueing hypotheses in the voter behavior 
and information literature. 
To synthesize these various approaches, it seems the emphasis lies on whether 
the level of analysis is the individual, the individual within a group, or the group. If 
the emphasis is on the individual, attention to belief, behavior, belonging, and even 
identity seem most fitting. If a scholar is looking at the individual within the group 




and how the individual influences and is influence by the group, networked 
approaches seem more appropriate. If a researcher is looking at group behavior, 
ethnoreligious or even interest group (Hertzke 2009, 2004, 1988) approaches will be 
more effective. It is striking that beyond Djupe and Calfano’ s identity approach, 
scholarship in religion and public opinion does not seem concerned about 
differentiating between religion as a deep belief structure and religion and its 
influence on surface level attitudes. That is, it seems minimal distinction is drawn 
between theology, the beliefs that form a theological system, and the political 
implications of that system of belief.  
Outside of the approaches to the study of religion and public opinion, scholars 
have addressed how religion influences voting behavior (McTague and Layman 2009; 
Green 2007), policy issues at home (Hertzke 1988, 2004; Djupe and Calfano 
2013)and abroad (Seiple and Hoover 2012; Rock 2011; Johnston and Sampson 1994; 
Guth et al. 2005), and the construction of American society (Skocpol 2002; Wuthnow 
1987; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Putnam 2000). What is clear from these studies is 
that religion has a powerful influence on the shape of American politics. It less clear 
as to the nature and magnitude of that influence when other factors, especially those 
that have ideological elements such as political ideology or party, are considered 
alongside religion. It should be noted that religion and politics scholarship seems to 
assume that respondents have coherent beliefs that influence attitude formation for 
public opinion and policy preferences.  That is, contrary to Converse, respondents do 
not need informational constraints to make non-random decisions as their decisions 




may be based on their religious belief system (Converse 1964). Additionally, 
opinions are not drawn at random as Zaller might suggest, if anything, religion forms 
the bucket from which respondents make decisions (Zaller 1992). Examples of 
stability in public opinion include matters of foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 
1987; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Raymond 1989; Aldrich et al. 2006; Knecht and 
Weatherford 2006; Risse-Kappen 1991; Jacobs and Page 2005) and security (Jenkins-
Smith and Herron 2006). Herron and Jenkins-Smith convincingly demonstrate that 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the public did not behave in a 
volatile way as would be expected if the public was uniformed and irrational. In a 
similar manner, stability is also found in domestic politics (Stimson 1975; Stimson, 
MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Stimson 1991; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and 
structured attitudes found in opinion on immigration policy (McDaniel, Nooruddin, 
and Shortle 2010). This explanation of coherence in public opinion or, at the very 
least, semi-coherence, needs continued improvement, but; it is useful to note that 
religion and politics scholars usually begin with an assumption that respondents may 
have coherent belief structures. I suggest that respondents may also have coherent 
religious beliefs which inform their opinion about climate and environmental issues. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation: 
Religious self-identification is usually a powerful indicator of political and 
ideological preferences. However, growing theological differences within the 
traditionally used categories of religion mask distinctions within these groups and 




decrease the power of the categories. One way to address the conundrum is to 
increase the category options available to survey respondents. Yet, without knowing 
all the possible traditions to which Americans adhere, how are researchers to organize 
the emerging splits within traditional religious categories in a parsimonious fashion?  
An alternative approach is increased attention to theology. Theological 
distinctions between and within religious traditions are complicated, nuanced, and 
messy. However, when carefully considered, theological traditions may bring to the 
surface broadly coherent, deep, and consistent belief systems that supersede religious 
preference. Thus, by looking for theological indicators, such as biblical literalism in 
Christianity, one can cut across the categories of Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and 
Evangelical to see common theological threads that ties members of those categories 
together in public opinion and potential action in civil society. Literalism and 
eschatology have been shown to be a powerful predictors in public opinion on climate 
change and foreign policy preferences (Chaudoin, Smith, and Urpelainen 2013; Gries 
2015; Barker and Bearce 2013).  Essentially, my approach advocates for the merging 
of significant theological and taxonomic work in religious studies with the powerful 
literatures on opinion and civil society in political studies. While each chapter uses a 
different approach, the general methodological thrust of the dissertation is to move 
beyond traditional conceptualizations of religious belonging or behavior and 
illuminate latent theologies of nature available in the data about religious beliefs. 
Turing towards the layout of the dissertation, I use a sequential multi-method 
approach (Klassen et al. 2012) where the chapters cumulatively build on the findings 




of the previous chapter. In this dissertation, the early chapters use qualitative analysis 
to help identify various theologies of nature presented by religious organizations and 
clergy. The subsequent chapters test these theologies at the individual level using 
statistical analysis of surveys addressing religion, environment, genetic modification. 
The specific methods are laid out below. 
Chapter two uses a text-as-data approach to look at public statements by 
religious denominations in order to identify how they view the relationship between 
humans and nature. This chapter is the most direct test of the Lynn White thesis and 
explores if certain Christian denominations hold the dominion-over-nature theology 
suggested by White. The statements are analyzed using a confirmatory grounded-
theory approach to identity categories and groupings in the theologies espoused by 
religious groups (Glaser and Strauss 2009). 
Chapter three is a qualitative confirmation of the theologies discovered in 
chapter two. Using elite interviews and participant observation, I asked clergy in 
Oklahoma about the state of environmentalism in their denomination, congregation, 
and personal theology. These conversations include questions on political action and 
social engagement, such as soup kitchens or disaster response, to help tease out 
possible political polarization climate change. The in-person interviews overlap with 
the survey area for chapter four and allow for some comparison between religious 
respondents, statements from clergy in the area, and national denominational position 
papers in chapter two. The interviews of clergy also expand the data beyond the 
majority white and Christian sample in the surveys. Sampling for the clergy comes 




from using publicly accessible lists of religious congregations and connecting to local 
and statewide religious clergy associations to identify ministers who are willing to 
join the study. The sessions follow a semi-structured approach and are analyzed using 
confirmatory grounded theory as in chapter two. 
Chapter four uses survey data from the “Weather, Society, and Government” 
(WSG) survey fielded in Oklahoma which has extensive questions on climate change 
along with a strong bank of questions on religion to explore how theological 
orientations shape public opinion. The survey is a panel study with data running from 
2014 through the present. The chapter begins with cross-sectional of one wave of the 
WSG data to lay the baseline for additional comparison. Questions on the survey ask 
respondents about if they believe climate change is happening both globally and in 
Oklahoma. Respondents are also asked about anthropogenic climate change, certainty 
about their opinion on global warming, scientific consensus on climate change, and 
related topics. Religious questions ask respondents about religious importance, 
frequency of attendance, religious affiliation, if they identify as born again, and 
biblical literalism. By indexing religious affiliation to the now standard definitions 
used by the Pew Forum, I create a variable that differentiates evangelical 
denominations from mainline denominations from Christian independents. The 
Christian independent category captures a plurality of WSG respondents, who 
affirmed they were Christian but declined to identify with a denominational 
affiliation, a critical finding in its own right.  




The rise of Christian independents indicates that denominations are in a period 
of instability if not decline. In highly religious states, such as Oklahoma, the most 
numerous religious group is now Christians who do not belong to a denomination or 
traditionally organized Christian religious groups. This means that using 
denomination as a proxy for religious belief is no longer sufficient. Instead, 
theological leanings must be measured directly. One way to test theology is to use 
biblical literacy as an indicator of theological concepts instead of as a flag for 
membership in an evangelical denomination (“America’s Changing Religious 
Landscape” 2015). In other words, theology matters and it can be studied 
productively using simple and common measures. Another way to measure theology 
is to utilize other theologically loaded survey items, such as questions from the New 
Environmental Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap and Van Liere 2008). The NEP questions 
create a master-over-nature dichotomy similar to dominion-stewardship dichotomy 
suggest by Lynn White thesis already found in religion and politics research (Hand 
and Van Liere 1984). This is especially true for the questions which ask respondents 
to agree or disagree that “humans were meant to rule over nature” (Dunlap et al. 
2000b). Taken together, the results demonstrate that indicators of theological 
concepts, such as biblical literalism or the NEP’s question on rule of nature, 
powerfully predict opinions on climate change and global warming even when 
competing with other proven variables like political ideology or cultural biases. 
 Chapter five closes out the dissertation with a discussion on eschatology, the 
Apocalypse, and end-times thinking. Using the language of the “shadow of future”, 




the chapter attempts to see if religiously-inspired time horizons influences opinion on 
environmental and scientific issue areas (Barker and Bearce 2013). The chapter also 
helps to expand the dissertation beyond climate change to other areas where a 
scientific consensus exists but is contested on religious grounds. For chapter five, this 
issue is genetically modified organisms. The findings from chapter five are 
suggestive, but not conclusive, in their support for the claim that theology matters. 
Yet, these findings, along with the previous chapters, show that the influence of 
specific theologies of nature can be detected on opinion about climate change and 
other areas where the relationship between humanity and nature is thrown into 
question by the Anthropocene. 
  
Conclusion: 
 Taken together, these chapters show that religious believers have diverse 
beliefs about climate change and other issues areas around contested science. Yet, 
religious theology stands out as a powerful predictor of opinion towards these policy 
issue areas. Biblical literalism and dominion-over-nature beliefs seem to indicate a 
worldview that cuts across denomination and political ideology, which accentuates 
trust or distrust of scientific conclusions about climate change, fracking, or other 
areas of contested science. For political scientists, this suggests that religious 
categories should be used with caution since there is a considerable amount of 
variability within religious denominations. Furthermore, it seems that centralized 
narratives and elite cuing do not always override individual worldviews inspired by 




religious theology. For policy makers, these findings suggest that more care needs to 
be given to power of religious narratives about creation and the relationship between 
humanity and nature as science and, by consequence, politics addressing increasingly 
complicated issues around the ability of humans to impact and modify the natural 
world.  




Chapter 2 : Denominations and Environmentalism 
Introduction: 
In this chapter, I use grounded theory to analyze formal statements, called 
position papers, from religious organizations and denominations to better understand 
how they deploy theological ideas to support or oppose political or politically charged 
issues. More specifically, I seek to determine if dominion and human rule over nature 
as postulated by Lynn White is reflected in the position papers. I also seek to better 
understand what denominations mean by stewardship as this language seems to have 
grown in popularity as a response White’s assertions. 
Why formal statements? Position papers are formal statements by an 
organization that help to clarify an organization’s belief about a certain policy or 
issue area for members in the organization and signals to those outside the 
organization. The role fulfilled by position papers is well known in public 
administration and political science. First and from an organizational perspective, 
position statements are similar to mission statements and values statements in their 
ability to focus an organization and increase its efficiency (Kirk and Beth Nolan 
2010; Weiss and Piderit 1999). Even though religious organizations often behave like 
their secular peers, the mission of religious organizations are usually expressed in 
terms of faith to justify their actions to their constituents, congregation members, and 
other religious groups (Ebaugh et al. 2003). For this chapter, religious organizations 
use these position papers to proclaim and justify their belief about an issue in society. 
They signal the orthodox position of a denomination to adherents and observers and 




can be used to define the boundaries of acceptable belief about a spiritual or social 
issue. Position papers are written by denomination to clarify theological 
misunderstandings or uncertainties or to apply theological understandings to societal 
issues. Generally, these statements can change over time as understanding is updated 
or the denomination faces contemporary issues.  
Second, from a political advocacy perspective, position statements help with 
the agenda setting and framing capabilities of a religious organization. Much has been 
discovered about agenda setting and framing in policy subsystems. Agenda setting is 
often defined as the ability of the media or elites to increase the importance of an 
issue for the mass public while framing concerns the terminology and narrative used 
to characterize an issue to the mass public (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Agenda 
setting and framing theories have been applied to political elites and public opinion 
(Chong and Druckman 2007b; Gilens and Page 2014; Nelson and Oxley 1999), 
policy subsystems and issue networks in general (Baumgartner and Jones 1991), and 
environmental politics more specifically (Wood and Vedlitz 2007; Jenkins-Smith and 
Herron 2006; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; M. D. Jones and McBeth 2010). 
Denominations use their position statements for agenda setting and framing many 
issues, including environment and global warming. These issues are explored in more 
detail throughout the chapter. 
It should be noted that the formal statements carry different weight with 
different denominations. In hierarchical religious organizations, such as the Catholic 
Church, statements from Catholic leadership are powerful. This is also true for 




theologically hierarchical denominations. For example, congregations in the Southern 
Baptist Convention are organizationally autonomous and do not have to answer to a 
centralized administration. However, the SBC encourages theological homogeneity 
and position papers define the boundaries of acceptable belief and practice for the 
SBC. In flatter or more decentralized denominations, the position papers are more 
advisory. In conversations with clergy from the Disciples of Christ, a small 
denomination nationally but very popular in Oklahoma, they stressed that the 
Disciples of Christ meets and then issues position papers at national conventions, but 
these reflect the “will of the assembly” at that moment.  
 
Data and Method: 
Sources for this chapter come from denominations popular in Oklahoma. This 
way, the dissertation can attempt to trace religious influences on environmental policy 
from national elites, to local elites, and finally, to the mass public. The decision to 
restrict to Oklahoma is also a way control for the geographical distribution of 
religious belief. As the Pew Religious Landscape Survey and data from the 
Association for Religious Data Archive illustrates, denominations vary in their rates 
of adherence from state to state (“America’s Changing Religious Landscape” 2015; 
“The Association of Religion Data Archives” 2017). Top five religious groups in the 
state include the Southern Baptist Convention, United Methodist Church, 
Independent and Non-denominational Congregations, the Catholic Church, and the 
Assemblies of God. Closely behind more well-known traditions are the Churches of 




Christ, Christian Churches (Disciples of Christ), and Christian Churches and 
Churches of Christ. These churches are unique since they are part of a uniquely 
American restorations movement that grew up in the American heartland during the 
late 1800s. 
Position papers were collected online from denominations with a presence in 
Oklahoma based and for which respondents self-identified as members in the 
“Weather, Society, and Government” (WSG) survey used later in the dissertation. 
 
Table 2-1: List of Denominations and Abbreviations 
Denomination Abbreviation 
African Methodist Episcopal AME 
Assemblies of God AG 
Church of God COG 
Disciples of Christ DOC 
Episcopalian Church EC 
Evangelical Lutheran ELCA 
Lutheran – Missouri Synod LMS 
Mennonite Menn 
Presbyterian Church PCUSA 
Roman Catholic USCCB 
Southern Baptist Convention SBC 
United Church of Christ UCC 
United Methodists Church UMC 
 
The list, as displayed in Table 2-1, includes the Assemblies of God, African 
Methodist Episcopal, Church of God, Disciples of Christ, Episcopalians, Evangelical 
Lutheran, Lutheran – Missouri Synod, Catholic Church, Mennonite, Presbyterian 
Church USA, Southern Baptist Convention, United Church of Christ, and the United 




Methodist Church.2 I also analyzed statements from the National Association of 
Evangelicals (NAE), the rebuttal by the Cornwall Alliance (CA), and the National 
Council of Churches (NCC). These are not included in the analysis since they speak 
for a collective of denominations and not individual denomination. 
 For the purpose of this study, the individual church alliances with umbrella 
organizations like the NAE and NCC is an acceptable marker for theological leaning. 
Churches differentiate conservative/fundamentalist or liberal/modernist theology 
from how they approach scripture and the authority given to the text. Churches with 
membership is the NAE are typically considered conservative while NCC is more 
liberal or modernist. These alliances are indicated in Table 2-1. It should be noted that 
the Roman Catholic church has a unique approach to scripture interpretation and 




This chapter began by asking if dominion theology existed in religious 
statements and wanted to know more about the type of stewardship. Using a grounded 
theory approach and following the initial approach of Glaser and Strauss, I read 
through all the statements and through several rounds of coding arrived at four central 
questions asked of each position paper (Glaser and Strauss 2009). The questions are: 
                                                            
2 A full list of these statements may be provided upon request to the author. 




“what is the relationship between humanity and nature?”; “is climate change 
happening and why?”; “who is affected and how?”; “what should be done and why?” 
Scholars of grounded theory debate over the most appropriate wording to 
describe these rounds of coding and how many levels it should take (Glaser and 
Strauss 2009; Corbin and Strauss 1990). For this chapter, I used three rounds of 
coding where the first round used an open coding approach to summarize key 
statements at the sentence or paragraph level of a position paper. Following the 
language of Glaser and Strauss, these are called concepts. The second round 
compared first round concepts against each other to reduce the number of concepts 
into more manageable categories. This created a set of mid-level categories in the 
analysis. Finally, the third round of coding compared the categories to create high-
level, or theoretical, categories. Before each section of the chapter is a figure 
displaying results of each round of coding, but, an example might be helpful. 
As an example of the coding process, a paragraph mentioning dominion and 
rule over nature was first coded at the lower-level using the concepts of “rule” and 
“dominion”. Moving up a level and looking at the whole document, both concepts fit 
into the mid-level category of stewardship-resource management. Finally, these were 
coded as part of the high-level category regarding the relationship between humanity 
and nature. It should be noted that I approached the text with some a priori 
assumptions about the types of concepts I would find, but, since these concepts were 
not well defined in the literature, I believe that grounded theory was preferable to 
qualitative content analysis. 





The Relationship Between Humanity and Nature 
 One of the critical questions asked of the position papers is “how should 
humans treat nature?” Through coding the positions papers from over a dozen 
denominations the concept map in Figure 2-1 was created. The outer edges of the 
map show the first round of lower-level coding. The words in the boxes are direct 
quotes and phrasings used in the denominational position statements. Moving in 
towards the center is the second round of mid-level coding. These categories were 
created by trying to condense the concepts by most-similar relationships. From the 
concepts emerged two mid-level categories. Finally, at the very center of the concept 
map is the theoretical category which emerged from the first and second round 
coding. For analytical reasons, the theoretical category is phrased as a question. 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  How Should Humans Treat Nature? Displayed by Coding Level. 
 




I started by looking at the position paper from the Assemblies of God (AG) 
and moved from there. The AG is one of the more theologically fundamentalist 
churches in the study and was key member in starting the National Association of 
Evangelicals. As such, the seemed to sit at the theological boundary of the study and 
would provide a good starting point from which to head toward the other boundary of 
the United Church of Christ or the Presbyterian Church (USA). Their paper on 
"Environmental Protection" stressed the use of scriptural citations to justify their 
position, spoke of both stewardship and dominion, and paid special attention to the 
role of Christian ideas about sin and right worship. In many ways, it fit the 
expectations of an environmentalism centered on human rule and dominion over the 
earth. For example, one line coded as "dominion/rule" states: "As stated in Genesis 
1:27-30, we believe God has given mankind alone complete dominion (authority) 
over the earth's resources".  Note that for the AG, they root dominion in the scripture 
and interpret this as authority over the earth. Other traditions, as I will show, vary on 
the definition of dominion.  
The AG position paper offers further illustration by grounding dominion as 
part of being a "good steward of all God's creation" (emphasis original) and that it is 
"the temporary home for all members of the human race". Coming into the reading of 
the AG position paper, I also sought clarification on Christian eschatology, the "end 
of the world", and environmental thought. From the AG position paper emerged a 
category coded a "temporary" where the AG described the planet as "our temporary 
home-earth". What this meant was clearly described in a paragraph where they 




claimed that "scripture indicate the earth will one day be consumed by fire and cease 
to exist (Zephaniah 1:18; Isaiah 51:6)"….and that later, "Christians will enjoy a new 
earth presently unknown to mankind (Isaiah 65:17; 2 Peter 3:13)". The concepts 
expressed here were later coded into the mid-level category of stewardship-resource 
management due to other lines within the AG position paper emphasizing 
stewardship of earth since it was a resource for human use. 
The AG was the only Pentecostal religious family with a position paper 
located. They are part of the larger Evangelical movement and can be compared with 
other Evangelical denominations such as the Southern Baptists (SBC). Like the AG, 
the SBC called for “stewardship and dominion” and tended to view the earth more as 
a resource for human consumption than an object to be preserved. The SBC 
mentioned their “support for the development of environmental public policy that will 
improve the stewardship of the earth’s resources…” The AG and the SBC were the 
only denominations sampled that seem to have an explicit stewardship as resource 
management approach. 
At the mid-level coding, the other difference that emerged was the idea of 
stewardship as preservation. In this approach, humans were again given stewardship 
over the earth, but stewardship did not include dominion or ruling. Rather, humans 
were responsible for caring for the earth and even serving the earth. The ELCA 
explicitly states that “God frees from our sin and captivity, and empowers us to be 
loving servants of creation” and through acting “interdependently and in solidarity, 




we do justice. We serve and keep the earth, trusting its bounty can be sufficient for all 
and sustainable” (emphasis original).  
Considering the relationship between humanity and nature, several tentative 
conclusions seemed possible. First, the idea of religiously motivated dominion over 
the earth was present in the denominational position papers, but not as originally 
conceived. Dominion did not imply recklessness, but rather an anthropocentric 
approach to resource management. The mid-level category of stewardship as resource 
management seemed to absorb other questions about dominion and eschatology. The 
earth was created as a resource for humans until the time would arrive when humans 
would no longer need the earth or they would be given a new one. Second, the 
response to dominion is not stewardship. As previously shown, stewardship can have 
a resource management dimension and contain overtones of dominion. Instead, the 
rebuttal is centered around stewardship as preservation. As seen in the position papers 
issued by several other denominations, they also believed in stewardship but added to 
this an element of service towards the earth or responsibility to care for God’s gift. 
Third, the authorities used to defend these positions varied across denominations and 
across the positions taken. Differences emerged immediately when looking at the 
position papers. The AG official position paper is structured more like a memo while 
the SBC position paper reads like a formal resolution complete with “whereas” and 
“resolved” before each sentence. Yet, on the stewardship as preservation side of the 
debate, similar differences occurred. 
 




Is Climate Change Happening? 
Beyond understanding how humanity should treat nature, there is a pressing 
question of: “is climate change happening?” It is highly possible that these questions 
are related and a closer examination of the positions papers will help to tease out this 
relationship. As in the first section, a concept map is used to display the results of the 
coding process. In Figure 2-2, the outer edges of the map show the actual words and 
phrases of the concepts discovered in lower-level coding. The second round of coding 
is one step towards and center and coalesces around two categories of affirming or 
challenging the science on climate change. Finally, at the center is the theoretical 
category of affirming or denying climate change. 
 
Figure 2-2: Is Climate Change Happening, Displayed by Coding Level 
 
From the denominational position papers emerged an answer to the question if 
climate change is happening. Mid-level coding found that the denominations either 
affirmed science and agreed that climate change was happening or challenged science 




and was uncertain about climate change. At no point did any denominational 
statement outright reject that climate change was happening. These mid-level coding 
categories were created by collapsing the concepts identified at the sentence and 
paragraph level. In the science challenged category, concepts such as overemphasis, 
natural cycles, or the political nature of climate science caused denominations such as 
the AG or SBC to doubt or minimize climate change and the role humanity might 
play in causing climate change. Unique to AG was the concept of sin and correct 
worship. While definitions vary in the Christian tradition, for an evangelical 
denomination like the AG, sin implies a separation from God or deviance by humans 
from God's intent. The AG is particularly concerned about Christians sinning by 
worshiping nature through taking "issues of the environment to the extreme" and 
resulting in an "overemphasis of the environment at the expense of spiritual issues" 
(AG).  
The SBC position paper does not use scripture but contests the prevailing 
scientific evidence about climate change leading to a category called "science-
challenged”. The perspective on science by the SBC is highly like a longer report by 
the Cornwall Alliance written as a rebuttal to both the National Association of 
Evangelicals and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The SBC position 
paper refutes climate change based on natural factors such as geological cycles like 
the Little Ice Age in the 1400s and questions the effectiveness of climate change 
reductions measures. This is because climate science is not trustworthy due to the 
divisions among scientists and the political agenda behind the IPCC since  




"while remaining politically active in the warning of catastrophic 
human-induced global warming, [the IPCC] has recently altered many of 
its previous statements, reducing its projections of the magnitude of 
global warming and it impacts on the world" (SBC). 
  
With the science affirmed denominations, there was less doubt expressed 
about the human role in climate change, they were willing to accept scientific 
arguments about the role of fossil fuels and carbon emissions in causing climate 
change, and if they used the language of sin it was in the context of human abuse of 
nature and vulnerable peoples. There was no hesitation to accept the "preponderance 
of evidence from scientists worldwide" that climate change is happening and that 
"most stem directly from human activity" (ELCA). The United Methodist Church 
gave a detailed description of the greenhouse effect and how "human activity has 
increased the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere" in a manner 
which could "produce conditions on Earth unfavorable to various species of life, 
including some human populations" (UMC). The Episcopalian Church highlighted 
how continued drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve threatened to "increase 
carbon emission but would also threaten the subsistence livelihood" of Native 
American peoples (EC). Churches such as the AME and the Church of God expressed 
similar concerns as the Episcopalian Church about "the burning of fossil fuels" and 
how it "is polluting our air and waters, warming the planet and putting our seasons 
out of balance" (AME). 
 




What are the costs and who is affected? 
 A third theoretical category which emerged from the coding focused on the 
costs and impacts of climate change and climate change mitigation tactics. This high-
level category was built from several concepts and mid-level categories as displayed 
in the concept map in Figure 2-3. As before, the outside edge of the map contains the 
direct phrasings used to create the concepts relevant to climate change impacts and 
costs. These were condensed into mid-level categories by looking for similarities. The 
result was four categories which looked at geographic impacts, human impacts, 
environmental impacts, and economic impacts. Finally, from these emerged the high-
level category of costs and impacts at the center of the concept map. 
 
Figure 2-3: What are the Costs and Impacts of Climate Change, Displayed by Coding 
Level 





The third high-level category that emerged from the coding of the 
denominational statements on climate change and global warming focused on the 
costs and impacts of climate change if any. These fell into four mid-level categories 
centered around geographic impact, human cost, environmental costs, or economic 
impact. The patterns were generally predictable. The AG, a denomination which does 
not believe in climate change, did not mention human impacts. The SBC, also a group 
that rejects climate change focused on the human and environmental impacts behind 
the cost of climate mitigation measures. Notably, the economic impact mid-level 
category was created from nearly entirely concepts expressed by climate change 
rejecting denominations. They stressed that the economic costs of mitigation would 
fall on the US and the poor as the efforts would "significantly inhibit" the "economic 
development and the development of the e international economy" and carbon 
reducing measures would "pass along the cost of emission reduction programs to 
consumers", finally, "poor people and underdeveloped regions of the world will be 
impacted the most severely by higher costs" (SBC). 
Denominations which affirmed that climate change is happening also looked 
at economic and human costs but did so build on different concepts. Human costs 
focused on the social harms that can come from climate change and that those "least 
able to mitigate the impacts" (DOC) will suffer the most. Building on Laudato Si, the 
USCCB observed that "people in poverty have contributed the least to climate 
change, yet they disproportionately impacted by it" (USCCB). Similarly, the AME 




position paper said, "low income communities, communities of color, the children, 
elderly, and our faithful in the Caribbean, Africa and in rural communities bearing the 
greatest burden" (AME). These denominations framed human costs or impacts of 
climate change in terms of justice and focused on power dynamics opposed potential 
financial strains on consumers. 
 
What should be done and why? 
 The concluding section of the findings from this chapter looks at what should 
be done and why? In other words, do the position papers make recommendations for 
climate change policy and what is their justification? The concept map, as displayed 
in Figure 2-4, is smaller than the previous section and the outer edges use direct 
phrasings from the position papers for the low-level coding. From these concepts 
emerge two categories of balanced or aggressive responses. Finally, these categories 
lead to a theoretical category on the proper response to climate change.  
 
Figure 2-4: What Should be Done, Displayed by Coding Level 
 




Denominations vary on how to respond to climate change, if at all. The 
concepts from the lower-level coding were reduced into the mid-level categories of 
balanced response and aggressive response. The balanced response was favored by 
groups such as the SBC, UMC, and EC while the more aggressive response came 
from the PSUSA or the UCC. Many, but not all, denominational position papers had 
concepts from both response categories. The denominations that rejected the human 
role in climate change did not offer suggestions or had a limited range of ideas for a 
human response to climate change. The AG believed that the threat of climate change 
was overemphasized and instead, in an extended quote 
"the Bible’s message declares that spiritual matters (those affecting the 
hearts of mankind) are the priority issues with God. These and not the 
environment are the reason He sent His own Son Jesus as a sacrifice to 
save people. For God did not send His Son to save the earth in a 
physical sense but to save the people who inhabit it. We believe this 
must be the main focus and concern for all Christians today" (AG).  
 
The SBC urged its members "to proceed cautiously" and they "strongly 
request that all public policy decision makers ensure an appropriate balance between 
care for the environment, effects on economies, and impacts on the poor when 
considering programs to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions" (SBC). 
Thus, while they showed support for some stewardship measures, they were in 
service of economic impacts or more immediate and short-term issues. The SBC 
urged "cost-effective measure" to reduce carbon emissions but opposed regulations to 
reduce emission levels, they supported stewardship provided it would not have 
significantly negative economic impacts. They also praised care for the vulnerable 
and especially regarding water access, electricity, improved medical care, and 




improved educational opportunities. The concepts expressed by the SBC illustrated 
the balanced approach they wished to take, on that would fulfill "God given 
obligation" to care for the earth in "tangible and effective ways" without causing a 
large economic burden (SBC). 
Other denominations expressing a balanced approach towards climate change 
expressed concerns about current patterns of consumption and sustainability. These 
concepts were seen in the Disciples of Christ through sentences about "limiting the 
future impacts of climate change", "address our patterns of acquisition and 
consumption" (DoC). The ELCA urged against "excessive consumption" and used 
similar language as the DoC encouraging their adherent to avoid excessive 
"acquisition and consumption". The PCUSA was the most descriptive of the position 
papers and provided specific examples of sustainability such as "adjusting 
thermostats, walking...turning off lights...recycling" and so on. The UMC urged 
individuals and congregations to "evaluate their own lifestyles" and "identify areas 
where reduction in production and release of greenhouse gasses can be made" 
(UMC). 
Several of the denominations proposed or endorsed more aggressive climate 
change mitigation tactics. Several unique mitigation suggestions were made by the 
denominations. The ELCA proposed an environmental tithe building on the Christian 
principle of tithing which is giving 10% of one's income to the church. The ELCA 
called for a 10% reduction of waste, consuming 10% less in non-renewable resources, 
"and contributing the saving to earthcare efforts" (ELCA). Mennonites also proposed 




a scripturally inspired solution to climate change through the idea of the Sabbath. In 
Jewish and Christian traditions, the Sabbath is literally defined as a day of rest every 
seven days in honor of the creation narrative in Genesis. Later, this principle was 
applied to agriculture and financial obligation through the year of Jubilee in which 
every seven years farmland was to be allowed to rest and excessive financial debts 
forgiven. In their statement, the Mennonite church used several paragraphs to 
describe Sabbath justice built on principles of Sabbath and Jubilee where the land 
should be given time to rest and helping the land and people to find "salvation, 
healing, and justice" (Menn). Going in a different direction, the PCUSA position 
paper argues for more aggressive and technical climate mitigation strategies. These 
include social costs of carbon, cap and trade, incentives for renewable energy, 
feebates to incentivize consumer purchases of fuel-efficient vehicles, a moratorium 
on coal and nuclear power plants, expanding rail networks in cities and around the 
country, and similar proposals. Unlike the ELCA or Mennonites, the PCUSA 
measures are rooted more in recommendations from international agreements such as 
the Kyoto Protocol or measures being proposed by advocacy groups and politicians in 
the United States than they are in religious principles. 
Embedded within the question of what to do about climate change is the 
question of why? While these could be disentangled, for analytical purposes, they 
choice of action and the reason for acting are often intertwined in the position papers. 
Across all the denominations in the study is a shared concern for the vulnerable and 
the poor. Both the SBC and the PCUSA, the ends of the scale for the least and most 




aggressive action on climate change, root their motivation for action in care for the 
vulnerable and poor, "the least of these", and "loving one another". Differences 
between these denominations in earlier categories on humanity and nature along with 
the reality of climate change seem to correspond with who is vulnerable, why, and 
how to help them. While all the denominations are concerned with the poor or those 
in poverty, it is denominations such as the AME and the EC and the USCBB which 
express concern for women and children, people of color, or Native Americans and 
indigenous populations. These denominations seem attuned to the dynamics of social 
power which create vulnerability and poverty and try to express solidarity with the 
vulnerable. Thus, while there was a consensus of increased stewardship, the 
denominations differed on how to mitigate the impacts of climate change and why. 
 
Conclusion: 
This chapter began with the objective of discovering if dominion theology 
existed in official statements made by religious groups. Additionally, I wanted to 
know more about the type of stewardship religious denominations embraced and the 
climate change policies they endorsed. Through a grounded theory analysis of written 
official position papers by religious denominations popular in the state of Oklahoma, 
four high-level categories emerged which offered some insight into the role of 
religious belief in shaping opinion on climate change and environmental policy. 
First, denominations are divided on the relationship between humanity and nature. 
This category speaks directly to the relationship between dominion and stewardship. 




While all denominations used the language of stewardship, those which also included 
phrases about dominion, authority, or rule over nature seemed to frame stewardship 
as resource management. This approach also carried some eschatological 
connotations and denominations seemed to express a belief that one day, in the 
indeterminate future, the earth would be remade or reformed. On the other hand, 
denominations that avoided dominion language stressed stewardship as preservation. 
In this approach, humans are to be caretakers of the earth and have a responsibility to 
preserve the earth and all the life it contains. 
Second, denominations differed on their opinions about climate change and, 
again, two camps emerged out of the analysis of the position papers. A few 
denominations rejected climate change, especially anthropogenic climate change 
because they doubted the science about human-caused environmental changes or they 
believed spiritual matters were of greater concern than environmental issues. In the 
other camp, most of the denominations accepted that humans could cause climate 
change and they generally believed the scientific evidence. Level for support or 
concern about climate change itself varied among the denominations with some 
strongly endorsing the finding of the IPCC while others simply accepted that it could 
happen. It does seem that the first and second categories are related and 
denominations which had a stewardship as resource management approach to nature 
also denied the human role in climate change while those with a stewardship as 
perseveration approach believed that anthropogenic climate change could or is 
happening. 




Third, denominations saw a range of potential impacts and costs of climate 
change and climate change mitigation strategies. Collectively, they highlighted 
geographic, human, economic, and environmental costs to global warming and 
environmental policy. While all groups expressed concern for the poor or vulnerable, 
they differed on who was vulnerable and how they would be affected by climate. The 
divisions in the high-level category of costs and impacts centered on answering the 
question, "who was vulnerable?". For a few denominations, the vulnerable were those 
who would be negatively affected by the economic costs of environmental measures 
and regulation. For others, the vulnerable were those who were most exposed to the 
environmental and socio-political risks of climate change. Again, these seemed to 
track with earlier categories and denominations that had a stewardship as recourse 
management perspective and rejected anthropogenic climate change also viewed 
costs and impacts through an economic lens. Conversely, denominations with a 
stewardship as preservation approach and accepted anthropogenic climate change 
tended to focus on the environmental and socio-political risks of climate change. 
The fourth and final category to emerge coalesced around preferred policy options 
and why they were supported by a denomination. This high-level category identified 
a split over balanced environmental policy and more aggressive climate change 
mitigation strategies. Balanced policy options included focusing on conservation, 
sustainability, and other cost-effective measures. Aggressive options included major 
lifestyle and infrastructure changes or religiously-motivated changes to social norms 
and structures. Yet, the denominations did not naturally break into camps for this 




category. While stewardship as resource management denominations only endorsed 
balanced policy options, stewardship-as-preservation denominations embraced 
options from both types of environmental policy. Additionally, all the denominations 
justified their policy position out of Christian concern for the poor and love of 
neighbor. However, a nuanced reading of these justifications revealed that the 
stewardship-as-preservation denominations were attentive to the social and power 
structures that increased vulnerability and often added the language of social justice 
to their support for an environmental policy. 
Taking the first and fourth findings begins to create a matrix for analyzing the 
tentative patterns in the position papers. In this case, the horizontal axis spans from 
stewardship as resource management to stewardship as preservation. The vertical axis 
ranges from aggressive response to balanced response. This creates a figure with four 
quadrants as seen in Figure 2-5. While a metric still needs to be developed to place 
denominations more precisely, general patterns seem to emerge. In the upper left 
quadrant of stewardship as resource management and balanced response would be 
groups like the SBC or the LMS. Notice that the AG, a resource management 
denomination, does not fit in the upper left quadrant as they have no clearly 
articulated response to climate change. Also, notice that no group fell into the 
resource management and aggressive response quadrant on the lower left. However, 
most denominations are located on the right side of the matrix, towards stewardship 
as preservation side. Groupings develop and denominations such as the UMC, 
USCCB, ELCA, and AME seem to cluster in the preservation-balanced response 




quadrant on the upper right. Below them, on the lower right, sits the UCC and 
PCUSA with more aggressive responses to climate change. The figure is illustrative 
only but helps to visually organize some of the patterns emerging from the reading of 
the position statements. 
 
Figure 2-5: Denominations Placed on a Matrix by Types of Stewardship 
 and Response to Climate Change 
 
In sum, the grounded theory approach has revealed categories within the 
official written position papers of Christian religious denominations which help to 
explain the theological reasoning for their support or opposition to climate change 
and available environmental policy options. Additionally, the chapter revealed that 




not all theological motivations are scriptural and some denominations grounded their 
reasoning through the embrace or rejection of scientific opinion. Furthermore, the 
grounded theory analysis of the position paper has shown that denominations do not 
naturally speak in a dominion-stewardship dichotomy, but rather, they embrace 
nuanced differences between types of stewardship. These differences seem to have 
dramatic down-the-line influences on opinion about climate change, who is affected, 
and how to help them, and why. In a final note, these categories are used again in a 
later chapter where clergy are interviewed and asked questions built on the four 
categories revealed in an analysis of the official position papers.  




Chapter 3 : Clergy and Climate Change 
Then I saw “a new heaven and a new earth,” for the first heaven and the first earth 
had passed away, and there was no longer any sea...He who was seated on the throne 
said, “I am making everything new!” - Revelation 21.1 & 5 
 
Introduction: 
The study of religion and environmentalism has gained significant momentum 
since early looks its social and political consequences. Early scholarship proposed 
that overarching theological themes in dominant religions, such as Western 
Christianity, lead to environmentally destructive policy preferences by some religious 
believers (White 1967). Political scientists began testing these claims using surveys 
and statistical analysis to uncover causal connections between religion, religious 
belief, and environmental policy preferences. Survey approaches have proved useful 
in illuminating individual preferences about environmental issues, such as belief in 
climate change or the balance between environmentalism and economic priorities.  
This chapter seeks to inform the findings of that chapter and add to the 
growing body of literature on religion, environment, and politics, by exploring the 
beliefs of religious elites and examining possible connections between those elites 
and the preferences of individuals within their own religious traditions. This 
contributes to the broader study of political elites and their influence on the public by 
focusing on an understudied area in political science. 
This chapter centers on this question: how might religion influence opinion on 
climate change and how would religious elites influence religious mass publics? To 
answer this question a mixed-method approach is employed to explore the 




theological, political, and environmental beliefs of religious elites and compares this 
to mass beliefs in their geographical area. This chapter presents findings from a multi-
modal survey of clergy in Oklahoma with some comparisons to the mass survey of 
religious believers in the same geographic area presented in the previous chapter. 
 
Literature: 
 The available literature of clergy studies is sparse when compared to that of 
mass opinion. Yet, there are several bodies of study from which this chapter draws. 
Both theories of elite opinion and the existing studies on religious elites can be 
instructive. Elites can influence public opinion through a number of ways including 
priming, framing, or agenda setting. While these avenues of influence are related, 
framing stands out as especially relevant to the topic of clergy and public opinion 
given the overlap between political elites and religious elites. For example, Druckman 
and Chong with their co-authors have offered a robust theory of how elites can 
marshal frames, or narratives about a public policy issue, and sway the opinion of the 
public (Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b). In a polarized environment, Druckman 
et al. argue that elite influence is intensified and the public becomes more convinced 
of less grounded opinion (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Elites remain 
relatively broadly defined and can include anyone who can create and present a frame 
or narrative to the public. Important for this chapter, I suggest that clergy function as 
a local elite and they may or may not agree with the agenda and framing coming from 
national elites who lead their denomination.   




It should be noted, though, that the process of elite framing is iterative since 
the public can also reject the frames from elites or lead opinion and force elites to 
adapt. While prominent theories support the idea that mass public does not have 
strong opinions (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), other research suggests that the public 
rejects frames or even leads public opinion suggests that individuals may have core 
beliefs which are relatively stable and other areas where they are more pliable. This 
research is supported by recent work in from scholars of public policy who have 
shown how narratives can be marshaled to support or oppose policy initiative using 
the Narrative Policy Framework (M. D. Jones and McBeth 2010). 
 Religion and politics scholarship approaches individual religious 
congregations in several ways. Scholars have long noted the role of congregations as 
voluntary associations in civil society (Ammerman 2005; Putnam and Campbell 
2010). Along these lines, congregations serve society in more direct ways through 
service delivery such as aid to their communities or partnering with the government 
in policy initiatives (Cnaan 2002; Chaves and Tsitsos 2001). Continuing at the 
congregational level but shifting the unit of analysis away from the organization and 
looking at the individuals within the congregation, research has shown that 
congregations create unique political environments which can shape the opinions and 
attitudes of individual members. However, this ability to influence does not mean that 
all members of a congregation will hold the same opinion (Djupe and Calfano 2013; 
Gilbert and Djupe 2009). Increasingly, clergy themselves have come under scrutiny 
as the level of analysis. Recognizing that clergy function as elites and can shape 




opinion in their own congregations, scholars have sought to understand how clergy 
are influenced by politics and how they influence their followers.  
 
Data and Method: 
The core of this project begins with a multi-modal survey administered to 
clergy in the state of Oklahoma. The “Religion, Environment, and Disaster” Survey 
(RED) was created using a modified tailor-designed survey where contacts received 
an email invitation to an online survey and were invited to qualitative interviewing 
(Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014; Stern, Bilgen, and Dillman 2014). At the end of 
the survey, respondents were invited to sign-up for additional interviewing by the 
lead researcher about the survey topics. Follow-up interviews took place both in-
person and over the phone using semi-structured interviewing.  
The initial list of congregations to contact was created by using the 
Association for Religion Data Archive online mapping tool to identify congregations 
in the Oklahoma City metro area (“The Association of Religion Data Archives” 
2017). Contact information was provided by a third-party vendor and 623 
congregations were emailed an invitation to join the survey with two reminder emails. 
51 congregations responded to the online survey for a response rate around 8%. I then 
conducted qualitative interviews on site with 18 ministers, all but one of whom were 
holders of the highest position in the congregation (the one exception held a 
leadership position in a megachurch but not the top ministerial position). 




Due to the relatively small sample size, this chapter employs descriptive 
statistics along with grounded theory to explore the theological themes utilized by 
clergy to address climate change and environmental policy issue areas. Grounded 
theory allows for the uncovering of categories within data and, in the case of this 
chapter, helps to confirm or challenge theories around stewardship-dominion and 
eschatological influences on climate change opinion (Glaser and Strauss 2009). In 
this way, the causal story is told more through narrative than statistical analysis. 
Mass opinion is determined by using data from the “Weather, Society, and 
Government” (WSG) survey fielded by the Center for Risk and Crisis Management at 
the University of Oklahoma. The survey is a census matched panel study of 
respondents within the state with the goal of measuring perceptions of weather, water 
and energy issues, weather risks, and government policies related to those issues.3 
To allow for better comparison across the mass survey, elite survey, and 
qualitative interviews, I focus on the narrative primarily on the Christian Church 
(Disciples of Christ) from the Mainline Protestant tradition and the Southern Baptist 
Convention from the Evangelical Protestant tradition. I use these denominations since 
they show the variation of Christian Protestant thought identified as causal by Lynn 
                                                            
3 The Oklahoma Weather, Society, Government survey is part of the Meso-Scale Integrated 
Sociogeographic Network (M-SISNet) and collected under the auspices of the Oklahoma Established 
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) with support from the National Science 
Foundation (Grant No. IIA-1301789). M-SISNet data is collected and maintained by the Center for Risk 
and Crisis Management at the University of Oklahoma. To access the data, codebooks, or learn more 
about the collection process, visit the M-SISNet repository at http://crcm.ou.edu/epscordata/. 
Further information on EPSCoR can be found at http://www.okepscor.org/. This dissertation uses 
data from the 2016 Oklahoma Weather, Society and Government Survey: M-SISNet Wave 9 (Winter 
2016). 




White, they are representative of the target population, and they have adequate 
response rates at all levels of the data collection process. Additionally, both 
denominations have well-articulated positions on climate change, including official 
position statements from the national administrative bodies of each denomination.  
Oklahoma is a good case for this kind of study since the population is both 
highly religious and highly tuned to environmental issues due to the impacts of severe 
weather, the presence of strong agriculture industry, and its economic dependence on 
the energy industry. Within the state, the Disciples of Christ represent the second 
largest Mainline Protestant denomination in the state of Oklahoma behind the United 
Methodist Church. The Southern Baptist Convention is the largest of the Evangelical 
Protestant denominations in the state of Oklahoma and has the highest adherence 
rates in the state (“The Association of Religion Data Archives” 2017; “America’s 
Changing Religious Landscape” 2015). Table 3-1 provides a list of the top religious 
groups in Oklahoma with comparisons across the RED survey used in this chapter, 
the WSG survey analyzed in chapter four, and the benchmark Pew survey. 
  The state of Oklahoma is decidedly more religious than the national average. 
However, results from the WSG survey are similar to state estimates from the Pew 
“Religious Landscape” survey, though WSG has a higher response rate within the 
state of Oklahoma. The “Religion, Environment, and Disaster” survey differs from 
the WSG rates of adherence, but the general pattern remains and Southern Baptists 
are the top Evangelical Protestant church while the Disciples of Christ are behind the 
United Methodist Church for top Mainline denominations. 




Table 3-1: Top Protestant Denominations in Oklahoma 
 RED-OK  WSG-OK  Pew-OK Pew-USA 
Southern Baptist 
(Evangelical) 
17.5% 23.8% 12% 9.2% 
United Methodist 
(Mainline) 
7.5% 19.4% 7% 3.6% 
Non-Denominational 
(Evangelical) 
15% 8.9% 7% 4.9% 
Assemblies of God 
(Evangelical) 
5% 5% 6% 1.4% 
Disciples of Christ 
(Mainline) 
5% 7% 1% 0.3% 
 
Based on the literature and using the surveys, this chapter focuses on several 
variables. The variable I wish to explain is belief in climate change. Unfortunately, 
the question is asked differently on both the RED and WSG surveys. The emphasis of 
both questions is similar, though, and both look at the claim of anthropogenic climate 
change. The surveys share explanatory variable of biblical literalism and stewardship-
dominion, using questions from the New Environmental Paradigm battery.  
Literalism is measured using standard question asking, “is the Bible the word 
of God and should it be taken literally, word for word?” Stewardship-dominion is 
measured using a question from the New Environmental Paradigm which asks 
respondents to rate agreement with the claim that “humans were meant to rule over 
nature”. The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) is a well-known battery of 
questions that seeks to uncover latent attitudes about the environment and nature by 
placing respondents on a scale from mastery-over-nature to subjection-to-nature 
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Hawcroft and Milfont 2010; Dunlap et al. 2000a; Best 
and Mayerl 2013). For the clergy survey, additional consideration is given to 




theological issues and clergy are asked about both their cosmologies and 
eschatologies. These topics were revisited in the qualitative interviews. Responses to 
these questions are explored in the findings below. 
 
Findings from Surveys: 
First, looking towards biblical literalism, Table 3-2 shows that Baptists hold to 
biblical literalism at higher rates than Disciples both in the mass survey of religious 
believers and the targeted survey of religious clergy. The difference between Baptists 
and Disciples for religious believers has a statistically significant chi-square value, 
meaning that the values are independent. A measure of independence could not be 
determined for the religious clergy due to low cell values. One thing noticed 
immediately is the difference between lay member and clergy of the Disciples of 
Christ denomination on biblical literalism. None of the Disciples’ ministers self-
reported as literalists while nearly two-thirds of the lay members did. This significant 
gap between ministers and laity, as I show below, show up in attitudes toward the 
Anthropocene.   
 
Table 3-2: Comparison of Adherents and Clergy for Biblical Literalism 
 Adherents (n=243) Clergy (n=8) 
 Baptists Disciples Baptists Disciples 
Literal 85% 64% 64% 0% 
Not Literal 15% 36% 33%  100% 
For “adherents”,  X-squared = 10.324, df = 1, p-value = 0.001313 
Sources: WSG Survey and RED Survey 
 




Second, and somewhat contrary to expectations suggested in the literature, 
believers in the Baptist and Disciples denominations responded similarly to the 
question used to measure dominion theology. This question asks respondents to rate 
on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree with 
the statement, “humans were meant to rule over nature”. As Table 3-3 shows, the 
mean response for Baptist and Disciples rests near 3, the neutral area of the scale. 
However, clergy responses pull a little closer towards the ends of the scale with 
Baptist clergy leaning towards “agree” and Disciples clergy learning towards 
“disagree”.  This suggests that religious believers in Oklahoma hold similar beliefs 
about how humans should treat nature. However, clergy from different religious 
traditions are on opposite ends of the spectrum from each other and they are slightly 
more extreme than the average religious believer in their own tradition. The gap 
between clergy and their congregants supports work by Djupe and Gilbert 
challenging the idea that congregations are relatively homogenous political 
communities (Gilbert and Djupe 2009). Yet, this chapter will show that the 
differences between clergy and congregations may be due to theological and 
organizational factors. 
 
Table 3-3: Comparison of Adherents and Clergy for Dominion over Nature 
 Adherents (n=243) Clergy (n=8) 
 Baptists Disciples Baptists Disciples 
Dominion over nature 3.3 3.2 4 2 
Mean value displayed for “humans were meant to rule over nature” where 1 equals 
strongly disagree and 5 equals strongly agree. 
Sources: WSG Survey and RED Survey 






Moving towards an explanation of mass and elite belief in climate change, 
Table 3-4 shows that more Baptists believe climate change is not happening than do. 
Additionally, respondents who are Disciplines are nearly evenly split with slightly 
more believing that climate change is not happening. Turning towards the clergy in 
each respective denomination, Baptist clergy match their fellow believers while 
clergy in the Disciples tradition differs sharply.  Here we may be seeing the impact of 
the general cultural conservatism of Oklahoma Protestants at the lay level, whether 
they belong to mainline or evangelical congregations.  Ministers, however, because 
they are educated and socialized in their denominations, appear to split more 
conventionally along mainline versus evangelical lines.    
 
Table 3-4: Comparison of Adherents and Clergy Regarding Belief in Climate Change 
 Adherents (n=243) Clergy (n=8) 
 Baptists Disciples Baptists Disciples 
Climate Change is Happening 40% 49% 40% 100% 
Climate Change Not Happening 60% 51% 60% 0% 
For “adherents”, X-squared = 1.7458, df = 1, p-value = 0.1864 
Sources: WSG Survey and RED Survey 
 
While the low sample size from the clergy survey limits the claims that can be 
made about the data, looking at the qualitative data from interviewing with clergy can 
illuminate how theology plays a role in climate change opinion and how clergy 
attempt to influence their congregants. 
 




Findings from Qualitative Interviews: 
Qualitative interviews of the clergy took place after clergy completed the 
“Religion, Environment, and Disasters” survey. Clergy were asked to submit contact 
information for a follow-up interview. Using semi-structured interviewing, clergy 
were encouraged to talk about their denomination’s beliefs on creation, eschatology, 
climate change, and other environmental issues.4   The coding of these interviews, 
using grounded theory, offer useful if tentative, explanations about the relationship 
between religion and climate change along with the clergy’s ability to influence 
parishioners. Three findings stand out. 
First, the stewardship-dominion dichotomy is complicated by how clergy 
speak out issues of creation, the human role in nature, and environmental policy 
preferences. The four ministers from the Southern Baptist Convention I interviewed 
strongly objected to the dominion language. Quoting portions of scripture, these 
clergy expressed that the earth was “fearfully and wonderfully made” and that “God’s 
good earth” should not be mistreated. Using the language of creation from the book 
of Genesis, they observed that the human relationship towards earth is more like a 
gardener than a ruler. Humans are to be stewards of the earth since “we’ll be held 
accountable for how we treat nature”. The three Disciples of Christ clergy expressed 
similar opinions. One minister noted that to exercise dominion over the earth is to 
abuse it, and instead, humans should be good stewards because “the earth is the 
                                                            
4 Interview protocol and transcripts may be provided upon request to the author. 




Lord’s”. These ministers were on both sides of the literalism and creationism debate 
and arrived at a similar conclusion about Christian responsibility towards earth.  
Regardless of how the earth was made, humans are to be caretakers and not destroy 
the earth.  This fascinating finding suggests ways the White thesis may be dated.  
Second, both groups rejected the eschatological narrative of earthly 
destruction. While a few of the Baptist ministers aligned closely with this form of 
eschatology, causing destruction to nature was seen as short-sighted and poor 
stewardship. One minister argued that if the eschatological end-of-the-world is truly 
unknown, as many in the tradition claim, the current generation must pass on a well-
tended earth to the next generation. Disciples of Christ clergy were more prone to 
reject the eschatological narrative outright but arrived at a similar conclusion using a 
different argument. According to their view, the destruction of the earth was more 
metaphorical than literal and the earth would be remade or renewed. In the words of 
one minister “God establishes his kingdom here on earth,” now.  
Moving on to policy solution, the Baptist ministers emphasized balance and 
avoiding swinging to extremes. As one Baptist minister said, “climate adaptation does 
not equal climate change activism,” leading the minister to express frustration with 
carbon taxes but welcomed efforts to put flood-prone houses on stilts. Another 
pushed against the “socialist agenda” of the American left while bemoaning the greed 
and selfishness in American society which leads to poor stewardship of nature. 
Disciples ministers expressed similar calls for balance and pushed against the 
eradication of fossil fuels by arguing for more compressive regulations and policies 




that favored renewable resources while becoming smarter about the use of oil. From a 
policymaker’s perspective, these interviews suggest that there is common ground 
between Mainline and Evangelical Christian clergy on issues of adaptation and 
natural resource stewardship even though they may disagree over the age of the earth 
or if climate science is trustworthy. 
Third, the findings from the SBC and DoC comparison seem to apply to 
similar peers. While the study had eighteen interviews, seven were analyzed in this 
chapter since there were enough responses in the SBC and DoC to make some within 
group comparisons. However, other clergy from denominations such as the Church of 
the Nazarene, Independent Christian Congregations, Jewish, and Messianic Jewish 
were interviewed. The Church of the Nazarene comes from a different tradition than 
either the SBC and DoC, yet, the Nazarene clergy spoke like the DoC and stressed 
that “nature is a sacred resource”. However, recalling the matrix from chapter 2, the 
Nazarene clergy emphasized a balanced response and argued that a Christian 
environmental policy would “think about nature from God’s perspective” and focus 
on “respect, dignity, and care” while “focusing on needs such as clean air and clean 
water”.  
Independent clergy also seemed to fit into the stewardship as preservation and 
balanced response quadrant. Clergy interviewed viewed nature as a garden which 
needed to be tended. One member of the clergy from the independent congregation 
spoke of how the wild buffalo herd was nearly eradicated in Oklahoma as an example 
of mismanagement and an unscriptural exploitation of the natural resources. Thus, 




just like humans could alter the western ecosystem, climate change could be 
anthropogenic. The solution, according to this clergy, was a balanced policy that 
avoided extremes.  
While an attempt was made to recruit respondents from non-Protestant 
traditions, I was only able to secure two Jewish respondents in the qualitative 
interviewing for this chapter. The Jewish rabbi spoke in different terms than any of 
the other clergy. The rabbi made no comment about the meaning of “rule over nature” 
in Genesis, unlike the SBC and DoC clergy. However, like the Protestant clergy, the 
rabbi rejected any sense of eschatology and emphasized that how humans treat nature 
now matters in the future. Yet, looking at the results from all the interviews, it seems 
clear that the dominion language is not used by clergy and eschatological concerns 
are usually suppressed in favor of more immediate issues and supporting a balanced 
environmental policy. 
Fourth, organizational structures appear to affect the ability of clergy to 
influence their congregation. Research on the organizational structure of 
denominations has already shown that the structure guides how churches engage in 
public life (Chaves and Tsitsos 2001; Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Chaves and Eagle 
2012). The Southern Baptist clergy showed signs of being part of a more hierarchical 
structure than the Disciples of Christ. Even though both denominations give 
congregations a degree of autonomy, the Baptists seemed more attuned to 
organizational norms and expected beliefs. During several interviews, the Baptist 
clergy cited official positions from the Southern Baptists Convention. This was not 




the case with the Disciples of Christ clergy. Though the denomination has a statement 
on climate change, it is non-binding and no church is compelled to ascribe to the 
statement. Instead, congregations are highly autonomous and the clergy expressed 
reservations at telling congregants what to believe. Instead, they emphasized the 
“priesthood of all believers” and the impetus for congregants to develop their own 
faith. This suggests that clergy control over congregant political opinions could be 
limited by the organizational structure of the church. This may also explain why the 
climate change opinion between Baptist clergy and believers was similar while 
Disciples clergy and believers were quite different. 
 
Conclusion: 
 Several important findings emerged from this component of the dissertation. 
First, the stewardship-dominion debate is present among religious believers and 
clergy, but not in the way hypothesized by the literature. For the clergy interviewed in 
this study, they seemed to agree that humans are not to rule over nature, but to be 
caretakers. Differences exist when one drills down into definitions of steward, which 
in some respects conform to the steward as resource management versus steward as 
preservation categories introduced in earlier in the dissertation. Second, eschatology 
seems to have less of an impact on climate change opinion than expected. In other 
words, even ministers who may believe that the end times are nigh do not believe this 
gives humans warrant to despoil the earth.  Third, the organizational structure of 




churches tapers the kind of political influence clergy can have over members of their 
congregation or religious tradition.  




Chapter 4 : Mass Attitudes and the Anthropocene 
Introduction: 
The central premise of this dissertation is that religious belief informs 
theologies of nature which, in turn, shape opinion towards scientific claims about the 
relationship between humans and nature. While the dissertation uses belief in climate 
change as the central independent variable which ties the chapters together, the larger 
question concerns faith during, and in, the Anthropocene. That is, do people of faith 
believe that humans can change the environment and how does their religion 
influence this belief?  
This chapter focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis and asks, how 
does religion influence opinion on climate change? Public policy researchers have 
suggested that individual worldviews identified through cultural theory, also known a 
grid-group theory, can offer an explanation for the conflicting opinions of the public 
(Goebbert et al. 2012). Sociologists joined by some political scientists have suggested 
that beliefs about the human-nature relationship as expressed in the New 
Environmental Paradigm explain how individuals approach environmental issues 
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978). Politics and religion scholars have suggested that both 
religious affiliation and religious belief may influence opinion on environmental 
policy preferences (Guth et al. 1993, 1995; Sherkat and Ellison 2007; Djupe and Hunt 
2009; Djupe and Gwiasda 2010). Despite the extensive literature on religion, culture, 
environment, and climate, these issues are not often considered alongside each other. 
This makes it especially attractive to explore how belief systems, such as religion or 




worldview, shape opinion on environmental policy issue areas such as global 
warming. What happens when these systems collide given the multi-faceted 
composition of religion? Does religion stand as predictive of environmental policy 
attitudes when other belief systems are accounted for? Building on the work of 
religious studies scholars, how do theological attitudes about nature influence the 
politics of climate change? 
This chapter begins to explore these questions using data from a 2016 survey 
of over 2000 residents in Oklahoma, a highly religious and conservative state, as a 
hard test of belief in global warming (George and Bennett 2005). The survey contains 
nuanced questions on global warming, certainty about warming and scientific 
consensus, environmental behaviors, and deep beliefs such as religion and cultural 
theory. After a brief literature review on public opinion towards environmentalism 
and religious approaches to environmentalism, the data are presented in several 
stages. Descriptive statistics are used to help visualize the contested landscape of 
environmental opinion in the case study. Next, the results from statistical models 
testing global warming opinion and certainty about global warming are presented and 
discussed in the context of the existing literature. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
looking towards the implications of the findings and future directions for the data 
used in the chapter and for scholars of religion and environmentalism. 
 




Literature: Environmentalism, Religious Belief, and American Politics 
Previous research has found strong, but contradictory, relationships between 
religious beliefs and environmental policy attitudes. From a more institutional 
standpoint, it was proposed that certain religious traditions were inherently more or 
less pro-environmental that others. This approach builds on Lynn White’s classic 
essay where he suggested that Christian Protestant teachings encouraged dominion 
over nature and treated the environment as a resource. Implied in White’s essay is 
that individual beliefs are conditioned by the theological tradition of the religious 
congregations that they attend and that theology powerfully influences individual 
perceptions of global warming and appropriate human responses (White 1967). Much 
of the subsequent literature on religion and environmentalism has focused on proving, 
disproving, or problematizing what has become known as the White Thesis (Eckberg 
and Blocker 1989; Shaiko 1987; Guth et al. 1995; Djupe and Hunt 2009).  Religious 
affiliation turned out to be a powerful but troubled indicator and scholars quickly 
moved into exploring the theological undercurrents that bind groups of religious 
believers together.  
Much of this work did and continues to focus on the Christian tradition. In 
that tradition, differences in approaches to the Bible, the sacred text of Christians, 
stand out as significant. Around the turn of the 20th Century, American Christians 
split into two main camps based on interpretive approaches to the Bible: 
fundamentalists and modernists. While the nuances of the split are fascinating, one of 
the most important developments to emerge from this split is Biblical Literalism. 




Literalism holds that God directly inspired the Bible and that it should be taken word 
for word. Additionally, literalism is highly related to inerrancy, the idea that no error 
exists in the Bible, though scholars of religion note several differences between the 
two that are not ready translated to mass discourse (Jelen, Wilcox, and Smidt 1990; 
Jelen 1989; Bartkowski 1996). Literalism can carry with it certain theological 
orientations, such as creationism, the idea that the earth was created in seven days as 
in the book of Genesis, along with adherence to fundamentals of the faith (Chaudoin, 
Smith, and Urpelainen 2013; Bartkowski 1996; Jelen, Wilcox, and Smidt 1990; Jelen 
1989). 
Turning towards environmental issues, literalists are more likely to oppose 
pro-environmental policy and especially international treaties (Guth et al. 1995, 1993; 
Chaudoin, Smith, and Urpelainen 2013). This may be tied to specific religious beliefs 
connected with literalism such as eschatology and understandings of the end of the 
world (Barker and Bearce 2013). Previous definitions have outlined Christian 
eschatology where “end-times believers hold that Jesus will one day return to Earth 
and commence a series of events (e.g., the Rapture, Tribulation, and Millennial reign 
of Christ) that will eventually culminate in a final battle between good and evil 
(Armageddon)” ( Barker and Bearce 2013, 268). Christians disagree over the 
sequence of events, but popular among literalists is some form of dispensational 
premillennialism. In this eschatological variation, Jesus will return before or during 
the wars, famines, and other trials of the Tribulation to take Christians from the earth 
in the Rapture. Premillennialism thus creates a sense of otherworldliness in some 




Christians since they will not be around for the destruction and rebirth of the earth 
that occurs after Armageddon (Marsden 2006; Barker and Bearce 2013; Guth et al. 
1993). Literalism may also carry other ideas about how the world was made, but the 
connection between literalism and the end of the world seems critical in the context of 
environmental policy issues.  
An alternative explanation that gets away from institutions and individual 
beliefs suggests that specific religious beliefs are less important than religious 
belonging. In this alternative, religion is trumped by party identification, political 
ideology, or other demographic characteristics. Religious believers may also align 
with a network in their congregation  that may push against formal religious beliefs of 
their congregation or denomination (Djupe and Hunt 2009; Djupe and Olson 2010; 
Djupe and Gwiasda 2010; Leiserowitz et al. 2015; Shaiko 1987; Sherkat and Ellison 
2007). In this chapter, I focus on evaluating theologies of nature as revealed by 
common religious indicators such as religious affiliation, biblical literalism, and more 
direct indicators on environmental theology. The expectation is that these surface 
level indicators will help to reveal a deeper concept around theologies of nature. In 
turn, understanding what religious individuals believe about the relationship between 
nature and the environment will help to predict opinion on climate change, certainty 
about the reality of climate change, and the possible risks from climate change. 
 




Other Explanations of Beliefs and Environment 
Three other explanations for environmental policy attitudes are considered in 
this chapter; these are cultural theory, the New Environmental Paradigm, and political 
ideology. These explanations are included in the analysis due to their popularity in the 
literature and the possibility that they might compete with religious explanations for 
opinion on climate change. Each is defined in turn.  
Cultural theory builds on grid-group theory from anthropology and suggests 
that political opinion and behavior can be understood through the use of measures of 
deference towards authority structures (grid) and trust towards others (group) 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). These cultural biases condition how one perceives 
risks from hazards, such as global warming, and appropriate mitigation strategies.  
Cultural theory can be applied across issue areas and has found ready application in 
some areas of public opinion (Gastil et al. 2011) and public policy (Swedlow 2011). 
Broadly speaking, cultural theory measures cultural biases along the two axes 
of grid and group. Grid stands for the “social distinctions and delegations of authority 
that…limit how people behave to one another” while group describes “the outside 
boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world” 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983, 138). More commonly, grid measures a respondent’s 
receptivity towards external rule while group measures a respondent’s value of 
belonging to a social group. The result is a four-way typology of cultural approaches. 
Those who value group belonging and group boundary while resisting external rules 
and authority are thought to be egalitarians. Those who place less value on group 




boundary maintenance and also resist external rule are individualists. Those with both 
a high value on group boundaries and on external rules are considered hierarchs. The 
final category identifies fatalists as those who place a low value on group belonging 
and yet a high value on external rules (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). This 
typology is frequently laid out on two-by-two matrix to create four quadrants. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Cultural Theory: Grid, Group Matrix 
 
Extensive work has been done on cultural theory and environmental policy 
(M. D. Jones 2011; Goebbert et al. 2012).  Cultural theory, when applied to climate 
change, broadly holds that individualists will be less likely to believe that climate 
change is happening and less likely to support governmental action to mitigate its 
effects. On the other hand, egalitarians should be more likely to affirm climate change 
and be more likely to support government action. The reason for this is that cultural 




orientations indicated by these measures find individualists less trusting of groups and 
less accepting of externally imposed rules. Egalitarians are nearly the opposite with a 
higher sense of group belonging and are more accepting of externally imposed rules 
when they are created by the group. Applied to climate change, cultural theorists have 
posited that individualists believe nature is benign and humans cannot significantly 
impact it while egalitarians believe that nature is more fragile and needs more care 
(Goebbert et al. 2012; Ripberger et al. 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
Expectations exist for hierarchs and fatalists as well, but most discussions of cultural 
theory and the environment emphasize the differences between egalitarians and 
individualists.  
A second explanation is the New Environmental Paradigm. Though it has its 
critics, the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) involves a well-known battery of 
questions that seek to uncover latent attitudes about the environment and nature by 
placing respondents on a scale from mastery-over-nature to subjection-to-nature 
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Hawcroft and Milfont 2010; Dunlap et al. 2000a; Best 
and Mayerl 2013).  
The scale is created by asking a battery of questions designed to elicit opinion 
about the relationship between humans and the environment. The NEP has seen 
several variations and the seven question scale in this survey is based on the 
shortened twelve questions scale developed by Dunlap and Van Liere (Dunlap et al. 
2000a, 2000b). The question wording is seen below and organized into two columns 




with questions associated with low environmentalism on the left and high 
environmentalism on the right.  
 




Humans were meant to rule over the 
rest of nature.  
 
When humans interfere with nature it 
often produces disastrous 
consequences. 
 
The balance of nature is strong enough 
to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations. 
 
We are approaching the limit of the 
number of people the earth can 
support. 
 
The so-called “ecological crisis” 
facing humankind has been greatly 
exaggerated. 
 
Humans are severely abusing the 
environment. 
 
Humans will eventually learn enough 





Scholars have noted the shortcomings of the NEP, in all variations, but seem 
to agree that it stands as one of the more reliable and generalizable measures of 
environmental concern (Hawcroft and Milfont 2010). Furthermore, the NEP has been 
used to show that some Christians have a higher sense of “mastery over nature” than 
others and that divisions among Christians can be seen among denominations (Hand 
and Van Liere 1984). In this chapter, I am especially interested in the question which 
asks respondents if “humans were meant to rule over nature” as it seems most similar 
to the dominion-stewardship dichotomy suggested by previous religious scholars. 




The third alternative belief system considered is political ideology. Since 
political ideology is used to capture a semi-coherent system of beliefs about the 
political system and social order, and individuals may change their ideology, unlike 
other socio-economic controls, it seemed appropriate to include political ideology as a 
competing explanation about opinion on global warming and certainty (Achen 1975; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Gerring 1997; Knight 2006; Jost, Federico, and Napier 
2009). In this study, ideology is measured using the traditional seven-point scale with 
increasing values indicating increasing conservativism. Some scholars have suggested 
that self-identifying as an ideological type, conservative or liberal, is a historically 
recent development and is more symbolic than operational (Stimson 2004; 
Camobreco 2016; Ellis and Stimson 2012). This underscores that while ideology is 
often measured unidimensional and through self-identification, there is the possibility 
of multiple types of ideology and that respondents may misidentify. Nevertheless, the 
use of self-identified political ideology is an important alternative to consider 
alongside of religious belief given the power of political ideology in informing 
opinion about environmental beliefs and its associations with certain kinds of 
religious belief. Previous research has suggested that political conservatives are both 
more skeptical of climate change (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Daniels et al. 2012) 
and, separately, more likely to belong to theologically conservative Christian 
traditions like Evangelicalism. 
These three alternative explanations of culture, environmentalism, and 
ideology are prominent and commonly used by researchers across different fields of 




environmental research, from policy studies (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; M. D. 
Jones 2011), to sociology (Dunlap 2008), to public opinion (Daniels et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, research has revealed complicated relationships across these alternative 
explanations that merit further consideration (Ripberger et al. 2012; Hand and Van 
Liere 1984). This dissertation is among the first to combine all three approaches with 
religious theology allowing a first-cut at an exploration of the relationship between 
theology, climate change, environmentalism, political ideology, and culture. 
 
Data and Method: 
 Based on the literature about religion and opinion on environmental policy 
issues, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
• Hypothesis 1 (H1) – An increase in literalism will result in a decrease in the 
belief that human-caused global warming is occurring. 
• Hypothesis 2 (H2) – An increase in literalism will result in an increase in 
certainty that global warming is not occurring. 
• Hypothesis 3 (H3) – An increase in literalism will result in a decrease in risk 
from global warming 
 
The data used to evaluate these hypotheses comes from the 2016 wave of the 
“Weather, Society, and Government” survey collected as part of the Oklahoma 




EPSCoR M-SISNet Survey with over 2500 initial respondents5. The survey is part of 
a large, census-matched, panel study of respondents in Oklahoma and collects public 
opinion on pressing environmental, energy, and weather issues in the state. The 
survey is appropriate for the purposes of this chapter due to the high religiousness of 
the state, the focus of the survey on global warming and other environmental issues, 
and the depth of questions about political, cultural, and religious beliefs in the 
instrument. 
 
Global Warming in Oklahoma 
The main dependent variable used in this study on opinion about global 
warming. The question asks: “In your view, are greenhouse gasses, such as those 
resulting from the combustion of coal, oil, natural gas, and other materials, causing 
average global temperatures to rise?” with the option of “no” or “yes”6. An additional 
question asks how certain respondents are about global warming on a scale of 0 to 10 
                                                            
5 The Oklahoma Weather, Society, Government survey is part of the Meso-Scale Integrated 
Sociogeographic Network (M-SISNet) and collected under the auspices of the Oklahoma Established 
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) with support from the National Science 
Foundation (Grant No. IIA-1301789). M-SISNet data is collected and maintained by the Center for Risk 
and Crisis Management at the University of Oklahoma. To access the data, codebooks or learn more 
about the collection process, visit the M-SISNet repository at http://crcm.ou.edu/epscordata/. 
Further information on EPSCoR can be found at http://www.okepscor.org/. This dissertation uses 
data from the 2016 Oklahoma Weather, Society and Government Survey: M-SISNet Wave 9 (Winter 
2016). 
6 The public does show sensitivity to the use of climate change or global warming in survey 
questionnaires with Republicans and Conservatives being generally more hostile towards “global 
warming” and less so towards “climate change”. Since the goal of this dissertation is to explore 
religious influences on the ability of humans to alter nature, using an anthropogenic global warming 
question is appropriate. (Villar and Krosnick 2011; Lorenzoni et al. 2006; Schuldt, Konrath, and 
Schwarz 2011). 




with 10 being most certain. Out of the respondents who answered the question, just 
over 55% agreed that global warming is happening while 45% disagreed.7 While a 
high percentage reported having high degrees of certainty about their answer, the 
differences between those who answered “no” and “yes” are striking. Modal certainty 
was 8 out of 10 across all respondents.  Yet, those who affirmed global warming were 
more certain about their belief than those who did not affirm global warming as seen 
below in Figure 4-2. 
The count density plot in the upper half of Figure 4-2 shows that more of 
those who believe global warming is happening have higher certainty about their 
answer than those who do not believe warming is happening. Mean certainty for those 
who answered “yes” is 7.19 while 5.87 for those who answered “no” as visualized in 
the violin plot in the lower half of Figure 4-2. Essentially, those who believe global 
warming is happening are slightly more certain about their answer than those who do 
not think it is happening. A Chi-square test confirms that the difference in certainty 
between the groups is significant (X2=125.7, 10 degrees of freedom, a p-value 
<2.2x10-16). The chi-square test does not help the causal story, but it does confirm 
that the difference between the means is not random chance. 
 
                                                            
7 Compare this result against the Yale Climate Change Communication project which estimates that 
63% of Oklahomans believe climate change is happening while only 43% attribute climate change to 
human causes. See (Howe et al. 2015; “Yale Climate Opinion Maps” 2017). 





Figure 4-2: Certainty About Global Warming 
  
 Respondents were also asked about how much risk they felt came from global 
warming. Risk is an interesting variable to test as it provides some sense of the 
immediacy of the danger from global warming. Thus, while eschatology is not 
directly tested in the WSG survey, risk may help to illuminate a sense of the 
proximity of danger, either in chronological time or geographical space. Not a perfect 
proxy, but perceptions of risk may help to shed some light on the “shadow of the 
future” (D. C. Barker and Bearce 2013). While the nature of this risk was left 




undefined, the respondents acted in predictable directions. Perception of risk was 
assessed by asking respondents to rate their sense of risk from global warming on a 
scale of 0-10, where 0 meant “no risk” and 10 indicates “extreme risk”.  
 
Figure 4-3: Risk from Global Warming 
 
As seen in Figure 4-3, respondents who believe global warming in happening 
also perceive higher risk from global warming with a mean score of 7.82 out of 10. 




Conversely, respondents who do not believe that global warming is happening 
perceive a lower sense of risk with a mean score of 3.57. The sample mean for all 
Oklahomans was 5.91. To test for independence, a Chi-square test confirms that the 
difference in certainty between the groups is significant (X2=1162.1, 10 degrees of 
freedom, a p-value <2.2x10-16). Thus, at surface level, a slight majority of 
Oklahomans believe that global warming is happening and are concerned about it’s 
possible risks. How might theology influence this belief? 
 
Religion and Literalism in Oklahoma 
The independent variable of interest, biblical literalism, is drawn from several 
batteries of religion questions. These batteries cover biblical literalism, religious 
affiliation, and other religious variables such as frequency of attendance or the 
importance of religion in one’s life. Biblical literalism uses the standard wording of 
“Do you believe that the Bible is the literal word of God?” with the option to answer 
“no” or “yes”.  Nearly two-thirds the sample (66.36%) believe that the Bible is the 
literal word of God while a third does not (33.63%).  This high percentage of biblical 
literalists is striking, indicating the strong theological traditionalism in the state 
population.  But it might also suggest that, in addition to reflecting deep theological 
world views, it also captures some common cultural norms that may be more 
superficial. 
The naturally high number of Christians in the survey make it an ideal 
instrument for looking within the broad families of the Christian religious tradition. 




Survey respondents were given the chance to identify either as Protestant or Christian 
(non-specific). Protestants were further divided into Mainline or Evangelical, while 
Christian (non-specific) were given a chance to identify their denominational type if 
they desired. Those who identified at Christian (non-specific) but did not associate 
with a denomination were relabeled as Independent. Further analysis revealed that 
Evangelicals and Independents held similar beliefs on literalism and measures of 
religiosity leading to the conclusion that Independents were generally Evangelical in 
practice but belonged to non-denominational congregations, a growing trend in 
American religious practice.  Nearly 80% of respondents belong to a Protestant 
church of some kind. This includes members independent churches who may or may 
not be aware of how their theological lineage traces back to early Protestant 
movements. The remaining nearly 20% of respondents choose not to answer or 
identified as atheists, agnostic, or another religious tradition as seen in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2: Religious Breakdown of Respondents 
Religious Tradition Percent of Respondents N 
Agnostic 4.65 98 
Atheist 2.79 59 
Catholic 8.56 181 
Evangelical Protestant 22.75 481 
Independent Protestant 41.44 876 
Mainline Protestant 13.39 283 
Mormon 0.99 21 
Other 5.44 115 
Total 100.01 2114 
Source: WSG Survey, Wave 9 (Winter 2016). 
Note: Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.  
 




Notably, around 40% of Oklahomans are Christian Independents meaning that 
they self-identify as Christian but are not part of, or are not aware their congregation 
is part of, a traditional denomination such as Baptist or Presbyterian. This finding 
reflects a move away from denominational branding in the modern religious 
marketplace, because some megachurches do, in fact, continue to affiliate with a 
denomination, such as the Southern Baptist Convention, but so de-emphasize that 
affiliation that members are not aware of it and thus would not respond as “Baptist” 
to surveys. To maintain comparability, religious groups were coded similarly to the 
Pew Religious Landscape Survey where ever possible (“America’s Changing 
Religious Landscape” 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Belief in Literalism Displayed by Religious Tradition 





Literalism and religious tradition were then combined in Figure 4-4 to 
visualize the percent of adherents in a religious tradition who believe the Bible should 
be taken literally. Closer examination of literalism with religious tradition shows that 
among Christians in Oklahoma, literalism is found among all types of Christian 
denominations. While belief in literalism exceeds 75% in Independents, Evangelicals, 
and Mormons, sizable subgroups within Catholic and Mainline Protestant Christians 
are also literalists. This observation cautions against assumptions that literalism is the 
sole property of traditionally evangelical denominations.  
For further analysis, Christian religious traditions were broken down into their 
respective denominations to look at literalism within each. For visualization purposes, 
a few denominations were collapsed into slightly larger categories. For example, the 
Assemblies of God, Church of God, and International Pentecostal Holiness Church 
were merged into a single denomination called “Pentecostal”. This also happened 
with the “Restorationist” combination, which is a combination of the Christian 
Churches, The Church of Christ, and the Churches of Christ (Disciples of Christ). 
This figure is displayed below. The “Other Protestant” category contains the Church 
of the Nazarene, Seventh Day Adventist, and other Christian traditions with low 
response rates. Figure 4-5 helps to illustrate that even at the denominational level, 
Christians disagree over literalism even if there is an overall generalization which 
could be applied to the denomination.  




Denominations which tend to be considered Evangelical have higher 
percentages of respondents who believe in literalism. This is especially apparent for 
Pentecostal respondents of whom nearly 95% believe the Bible is the literal word of 
God. Notice, though, that even in among denominations firmly in the Mainline camp, 
belief in literalism is still strong. For example, among Episcopalian and Presbyterian 
respondents, just over 25% believe the Bible is literalism. Thus, while literalism is 
strongest in Evangelical denominations, it is not isolated to those Christians alone. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Belief in Literalism Displayed by Christian Denomination: 
  





In an exploratory analysis of descriptive statistics for warming, certainty, risk, 
and literalism, the findings suggest that literalism does help drive differences about 
global warming.  For example, Table 4-3 shows that 55% of literalists do not agree 
that global warming is happening versus only 31% of non-literalists.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that 45% of the biblical literalists agree that global warming is happening 
requires further exploration.  It suggests that believing that the bible is the literal word 
of God does not translate, for all literalists, into a view that humans cannot change 
God’s creation, or into a dominion position that is associated with climate change 
denial. 
     
Table 4-3: Belief in Global Warming by Biblical Literalism 
IS GLOBAL WARMING 
HAPPENING? NO YES TOTAL 
LITERAL 55.32% (707) 44.68% (571) 100% (1278) 
NONLITERAL 31.12% (202) 68.88% (447) 100% (649) 
 
In addition to the religion battery, three other sets of questions are used to 
measure control variables around cultural theory, the New Environmental Paradigm, 
and political ideology. These were all discussed in more detail in the previous section, 
however, some descriptive statistics are useful before proceeding to the statistical 
analysis. The cultural theory battery consists of four questions used to determine if a 
respondent highly identifies with egalitarianism, fatalism, hierarchism, or 
individualism. In the case of a tie between the values, tie breaker questions are used 




to encourage respondents to pick one trait over the other. In Table 4-4, Oklahomans 
identified most strongly as individualists with a mean value of 6.9 out of a 10-point 
scale where 10 is strongly agree and 0 is strongly disagree. 
 
Table 4-4: Cultural Theory Types 
CULTURAL TYPE MEAN SD MEDIAN RANGE N 
EGALITARIANISM 4.34 2.96 4 0-10 2172 
FATALISM 3.34 2.85 3 0-10 2172 
HIERARCHISM 4.77 2.92 5 0-10 2172 
INDIVIDUALISM 6.29 2.90 7 0-10 2172 
 
Based on previous literature and given the high identification with 
individualism in Oklahoma, respondents should generally believe that humans cannot 
negatively harm the environment. Yet, there are other ways to measure approaches 
towards the environment. 
The New Environmental Paradigm is measured using a seven-question battery 
that is later combined into a single additive index for analytical purposes. In this 
index, a score closer to 5 indicates stronger support for a high-environmentalist 
worldview while a 0 is weak support. Internal consistency of the NEP index was 
checked using two tests. After reverse coding so that all seven questions were scaled 
in the same direction, where a higher score indicates high-environmentalist attitudes 
(Dunlap et al. 2000b), the NEP index used in this project has a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.67. While low, this result suggests sufficient internal consistency. In an additional 
check, an unrotated principal components analysis revealed that six of the seven 
questions loaded onto a single factor and explained 35% of the variance. All seven 




questions loaded onto the second component and explained an additional 17% of the 
variance for a total of 53%. Encouragingly, when loaded onto the second component, 
the low environmentalism questions were all negative while all the high 
environmentalism questions were all positive. Consistent with previous research on 
NEP, this suggests that collapsing the seven NEP questions into a single index is 
appropriate and the index is consistent. The mean NEP in Oklahoma is 3.46 out of 5 
and suggests that respondents are slightly high-environmentalist in general. 
The relationship between NEP and literalism is theoretically important due to 
the theological overlap with some biblical views. For example, one question in the 
NEP battery asks respondents to agree or disagree that humans were meant to rule 
over nature. This question is very similar to the competing claims of dominion and 
stewardship theology; thus, literalism maps onto NEP in a way that suggests this 
theological clash is at play. Descriptively, biblical literalists had a lower NEP score 
than non-literalists. The average respondent had a NEP of 3.46 out of 5, literalists sat 
at 3.28, and non-literalists were at 3.66.  Similar patterns occur with religious 
attendance, with low attendees having a higher NEP of 3.55 opposed to high 
attendees with a lower NEP of 3.19. For religious affiliation, it may be best to 
visualize a continuum, starting with Mormons at 3.01 and moving sequentially 
through the other traditions of Evangelical, Christian non-specific, Mainline, Other 
Religions, Agnostic, and ending with Atheists at the highest NEP score of 4.01. This 
makes the NEP a possible proxy for the dominion-stewardship dichotomy suggested 
by the Lynn White thesis and substantiates some of the claims about religious 




affiliation and attitudes towards nature made in this dissertation (Hand and Van Liere 
1984; Goebbert et al. 2012). Particularly appealing is NEP’s question on human rule 
over nature due to its clear expression of the dominion-stewardship dichotomy since 
the question asks: “do you think humans were meant to rule over nature?” In the 
hypotheses tests below, both the full version of the NEP and the single question on 
human rule over nature (rule) are utilized. 
The last of the belief-system measures, ideology, was measured using a 
traditional seven-point scale ranging from strongly liberal at 1 to strongly 
conservative at 7. Among respondents, peaks are seen at 2 (liberal), 4 (moderate), and 
6 (conservative) with the modal response in Oklahoma being conservative and the 
mean response being 4.63 (moderate). 
Along the way, standard socio-economic demographic controls are utilized 
and these include race, ethnicity, gender, children, education, and income. Previous 
studies have suggested that these factors may have a considerable influence on global 
warming opinion. For example, the presence of children or females may cause a 
respondent to be more sensitive to risks presented by global warming, or, higher 
education is generally associated with acceptance of scientific information such as 
global warming. Age, income, and number of children in the household are 
continuous variables based on open-ended questions in the survey.  Female, non-
white, and Hispanic are all binary variables with a 1 in either of the three categories 
affirming the category. Education increases from some high school to Ph.D. or 




another advanced degree at the top of the scale. In the chapter, these variables are 
used as controls and explained as necessary in the results.  
 
Results and Findings: 
 Each of the hypotheses are tested in turn. A logit regression is used for H1 due 
to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, “is global warming happening?” 
For both H2 and H3, ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is utilized to test the 
hypothesis and the ordinal dependent variable on certainty about a respondents’ 
opinion on global warming and risk from global warming. 
Logit regression is used to predict a response to H1 and the question: “is 
global warming happening?” In H1, I expect that an increase in literalism will result 
in a decrease in the belief that human-caused global warming is occurring. The 
dependent variable is global warming and the full question wording explicitly 
references human-caused global warming and respondents are given the option of 
agreeing or disagreeing that anthropogenic global warming is happening. The 
hypothesis test begins with SES and demographic controls and then batteries of 
religious belief and belief system variables are added in successive iterations of the 
hypothesis test.  
While the full output of the logistic regression is displayed in the Appendix, 
the final run of the hypothesis test is discussed here and the regression coefficients are 
represented visually using a coefficient plot of the dependent variables in Figure 4-6. 
The variables presented in Figure 4-6 maintained significance and their direction in 




all runs of the model. The exception to this finding is literalism, which will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Coefficient Plot for Logistic Regression on Belief in Global Warming 
 
 While Figure 4-6 shows that literalism is significant since the error bars for 
the variable do not cross the zero line, early results of the regression find that 
literalism is not consistently statistically significant even though it does seem to move 




in a negative direction as proposed in the hypothesis (-0.352**). In earlier runs of the 
tests for H1 as seen in the Appendix, literalism was significant but dropped out once 
NEP was added. However, this did not occur when NEP, a composite index, was 
broken apart and only the theologically loaded question of human rule over nature 
(rule) was used in place of the full NEP. It seems likely that the NEP and rule capture 
some of the theological understanding of nature expressed by literalists but do so in 
diverse ways.  
The NEP is a panel of seven questions used to measure environmental 
attitudes. While the NEP asks respondents if “humans were meant to rule over 
nature”, additional questions are asked to determine if individuals are high or low 
environmentalist. When NEP and literalism are put together in the same statistical 
model, the effect of literalism on predicting opinion about global warming is covered 
by the effect of the NEP. However, it should be noted that an interaction exists 
between these two and literalists also tend to be low environmentalist. When NEP is 
replaced by rule, a more direct theological question about human rule over nature, 
literalism retains statistical significance. This suggests that biblical literalism is an 
important indicator since it can have direct and indirect effect on predicting opinion 
about global warming. 
Notably, in the full run of the model, none of the religion variables were 
statistically significant. This includes variables measuring the frequency of church 
attendance, church denomination, or evangelical/non-evangelical divides. Instead, the 
strongest explanation of agreement or disagreement that global warming is happening 




comes from political control variables. Party identity is significant with Democrats 
being likely to believe that global warming is happening (0.906***) while the 
strongest disagreement comes from those who are more ideologically conservative (-
0.462***).  Given the political science literature on partisan polarization, partisan 
media filtering, and geographic sorting into homogenous enclaves, and given how 
clearly the parties are divided on global warming, we should not be surprised that 
party and ideology strongly drive views on this specific policy issue.   
Cultural theory receives mixed support with egalitarianism (0.108***) and 
fatalism (-0.046*) reaching statistical significance while hierarchism (0.036) and 
individualism (-0.021) do not. Applied to the hypothesis, an increase in egalitarianism 
or is associated with an increased likelihood that the respondent believes that global 
warming is happening while an increase in fatalism reduces belief in global warming. 
These results are clearer when visualized using predicted probabilities in Figure 4-7. 
Predicted probabilities convert the coefficients from logistic regression into a 
likelihood for success on a 0-1 scale. A value near zero indicates a low likelihood of 
success while a value near 1 indicates a higher likelihood. Success is defined as 
agreement that global warming is happening. 
 





Figure 4-7: Predicted Probabilities of Belief in Global Warming 
 
Turning towards the second hypothesis on the certainty about global warming 
the same approach to the hypothesis test is used but the dependent variable is 
changed. Certainty is measured on a 0-10 Likert scale where moving from 0 towards 
10 indicates increasing certainty about a respondent’s answer to global warming. For 
the sake of interpretive clarity, certainty that global warming is happening is coded 




positively while certainty that warming is no happening is coded negatively. This 
creates a -10 to +10 scale. Thus, -10 represents high certainty that warming is not 
happening, 0 represents no certainty, and +10 represents high certainty that warming 
is happening. Using an OLS regression to test certainty about global warming shows 
patterns like the results of the logit model, but there are some notable differences as 
seen in results Figure 4-8. 
The second hypothesis test examines the claim of H2 that an increase in 
literalism is associated with stronger certainty about global warming, some support is 
evidenced. In testing H2, results available in Appendix 1 show that literalists are less 
certain that about global warming than non-literalists (-1.316*). This is true even 
when religious affiliation and other belief systems are included in the model. As in 
the first hypothesis test and the prediction of global warming, an increase in 
dominion/rule is associated with less certainty that global warming is happening (-
0.497***). Mixed results are again seen for cultural theory with only egalitarianism 
and individualism crossing into significance but in opposite directions. Strong 
individualists are less certain about global warming (-0.103*) while strong 
egalitarians are more certain global warming is happening (0.303***). 





Figure 4-8: Coefficient Plot for OLS on Certainty About Global Warming 
 
 Turning to the control variables in the hypothesis test, political ideology is 
strongly significant and increasing conservativism is associated with the decreasing 
certainty about global warming (-1.268***). Political party identification with the 
Democratic party, as before, is associated an increase in certainty about global 
warming (3.091***). Overall, the full model for the hypothesis test had an r-square 




around 0.38 and explained about 38% of the variance. Taken together, these results 
suggest that literalism and related theological beliefs around dominion and human 
rule over nature stand on their own as an explanation for certainty about opinions on 
global warming even when alternative belief systems are considered. 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Coefficient Plot for OLS on Perceived Risks from Global Warming 




The third and final hypothesis test examines the claim of H3 where an 
increase in literalism is associated with lower risk from global warming. Full results 
are available in the Appendix and are visually displayed in Figure 4-9. The regression 
model for H3 reveals that literalists perceive less risk about their opinion on global 
warming than non-literalists (-0.671***). It should be noted that in the full run of this 
hypothesis test, other religion variables were significant even if the effect was mild. 
An increase in the frequency of attendance at a religious service was associated with a 
decline in the perception of risk (-0.077*). Somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the 
importance of religion is positively associated with an increase in risk perception 
(0.094**). This is true even when religious affiliation and other belief systems are 
included in the model. As in earlier hypothesis tests, those who believe that humans 
are to rule over nature have a lower perception of risk (-0.246***). The cultural 
theory variables perform as in the other hypothesis tests and only two of four cultural 
types are significant. Increases in either hierarchism (0.059**) and egalitarianism 
(0.168***) are both associated with increases in perception of risk from global 
warming. Political explanations fare well in the hypothesis test and political ideology 
is strongly significant. The more conservative a respondent is, the less risk they assess 
from global warming (-0.530***) and conversely, those associated with the 
Democratic party (1.055***) have a higher perception of risk than their Republican 
counterparts.  
The findings offer support for H3 and show that literalists have a lower 
perception of risk from global warming than non-literalists. Explaining why this 




occurs could be a product of literalism itself and the inclusion of the variable rule in 
the hypothesis test is instructive since the rule also moves in the same direction as 
literalism. That is, increases in both literalism and dominion-like perspectives about 
human rule over nature lead to lower perceptions of risk from global warming.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions: 
 This chapter began with the goal of exploring the relationship between belief 
systems and global warming. Using measures of cultural theory, environmentalism, 
political ideology, and religious belief, I suggested that biblical literalists would be 
(H1) more skeptical of anthropogenic global warming, (H2) they would be more 
certain of their opinion about global warming than literalists, (H3) and they would 
have a lower sense of risk from global warming. The assumption behind all three 
hypotheses was that biblical literalism is a good indicator of theological concepts 
about environmentalism. While the results of the statistical analysis show that biblical 
literalism can predict some opinion on global warming, other indicators seem to 
better explain why those opinions exist. 
Summarizing the findings in the statistical analysis, it became clear that 
literalists were less likely to believe in global warming, but this finding struggled for 
statistical significance in some versions of the analytical model used to test H1. 
Iterative runs of the model for H1 show that literalism competes with the New 
Environmental Paradigm (NEP) in predicting belief in global warming. This is 
because, the NEP directly measures if humans were meant to rule over nature 




(dominion/rule), a question at the very crux of the dominion-stewardship debate 
which literalism is also supposed to predict. These results suggest that biblical 
literalism is an important but imperfect indicator of some theological concepts. If 
literalism fully expressed the concept of dominion over nature as expected in previous 
scholarship, NEP or dominion/rule should have never been statistically significant. 
Instead, dominion/rule was as predictive of opinion on global warming as literalism. 
This suggests that Christian dominion theology, when defined as “ruling over nature”, 
is a concept which exists outside of beliefs about the literalism of sacred scripture and 
is not completely contained within the indicator literalism. 
Previous scholarship has suggested that biblical literalists hold more of a 
resource approach to the environment than non-literalists (White 1967; Chaudoin, 
Smith, and Urpelainen 2013; Guth et al. 1993). This means that humans have 
dominion or rule over nature and should approach nature as a resource for human use. 
Stepping back and considering the evidence from the chapter two’s study of official 
congregational statements about climate change and chapter three’s study of 
interviews with clergy, the question regarding human rule over nature could reflect a 
resource management approach to stewardship that is popularly seen in some 
evangelical theology. Thus, dominion over nature could be better reframed as 
stewardship/resource management. 
Literalism performed better when looking at certainty about global warming 
or risk from global warming. In the second hypothesis test, literalism was 
significantly linked to certainty about opinion on global warming. Literalists are more 




certain about their opinion on global warming than their non-literalist counterparts. 
This finding stands even when other belief systems are accounted for and suggests 
that religious belief has an influential effect on certainty about opinion on 
environmental policy issues. In the third hypothesis test, literalism was significantly 
linked to a lower sense of risk from global warming as expected. This finding stood in 
all runs of test and shows that literalism has an independent effect on perceptions of 
global warming. 
What does this mean for the relationship between religion and 
environmentalism? Returning to H1, H2, and H3, the hypotheses are only partially 
substantiated in the models since H2 and H3 are supported and H1 is not. Yet, several 
tentative conclusions and areas for further exploration emerged for the larger 
literature of global warming and environmental policy. First, religious affiliation or 
denominational belonging did not seem to impact belief about global warming. This 
works against the White Thesis and other denominationally centered approaches and 
suggests that church affiliation may not matter more than religious belief. This may 
be due to sorting within religious groups. Second, biblical literalism offers some 
explanative value for belief in global warming independent of other well-studied 
predictors like culture, environmentalism, or political ideology.  Moreover, literalism 
does help to explain certainty about opinions on global warming and risk from global 
warming independent of culture, environmentalism, and ideology. Assuming that 
these are all belief systems, this finding suggests that studies on global warming and 




climate policy might be improved by considering religious beliefs alongside other 
belief systems.  
Questions remain about the precise relationship between religion and 
environmental policy issues, specifically how literalism relates to the New 
Environmental Paradigm and rule/dominion. Specifically, it should be noted that 
since literalism and rule/dominion retained significance when tested, it is possible that 
literalism cannot always be used in place of rule/dominion. Otherwise, the variables 
would have canceled each other out and instead, each had an independent effect on 
risk of global warming. This suggests that dominion theology may operate 
independently of literalism and further statistical modeling measuring interactions or 
structural equation modeling will be highly beneficial. Additionally, further work is 
needed to better understand how non-Christian or non-religious beliefs interact with 
other belief systems to inform opinion on global warming. This chapter uses data that 
is great for research on Christian populations, but what might other religious 
traditions offer? Additionally, do the results change when the sample population 
changes from mostly white Christians to mostly Hispanic or African American 
believers? While more work remains to be done, this study has shown that theology 
influences environmental opinion intangible, if nuanced ways. Past research has 
tended to address these belief systems separately, but researchers may gain more 
insight into individuals’ complex relationship with nature by considering how 
respondents reconcile their religion and their worldviews.  




Chapter 5 : The End Times, Eschatology, and the Natural Order8 
Introduction: 
The idea of the Anthropocene centers around the human ability to shape 
nature. This includes both creating new things in nature, such as genetic modification, 
and the human ability to destroy, such as climate change. Global warming and 
climate change are commonly viewed through the human ability to unleash forces 
which may harm or terminate human existence. IPCC and US government reports 
both highlight how global warming will lead to or amplify cycles of rising oceans, 
more severe weather patterns, increased drought and famine, and the increased 
chances of geo-political conflicts caused by these changes (“Climate Change 2014: 
Synthesis Report” 2014; “2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap” 2014). The 
scale and scope of potential climate change impacts sound like events connected with 
versions of Christian belief about the end of the world. 
At the end of the Christian Bible, the Book of Revelation contains the story of 
the Apocalypse and the so-called “End-times”. The Apocalypse is a period where 
some Christians believe the earth is ravaged by plagues, famines, drought, and war all 
associated with the return of Jesus to the earth. This leads to a question, is there a 
relationship between Christian theology about the end of the world and contemporary 
claims about climate change? More broadly, what might theologies of nature and the 
                                                            
8 This chapter is adapted from a conference paper written with Dr. Allyson Shortle and presented at 
the 2016 Midwest Political Science Association annual conference (Shortle and Pudlo 2016). 




creation and destruction of the natural world suggest about the relationship between 
religion and science more generally? Since the Anthropocene assumes the human 
ability to alter the natural world, does end-times thinking influence attitudes about 
anthropogenic modifications to creation? 
Departing slightly from the course of the dissertation thus far, this chapter 
draws a unique set of questions about the end-times to show that apocalyptic theology 
does influence how religious adherents view the relationship between humans and 
nature. While the implications for attitudes about climate change are limited, the 
broader application of this chapter suggests that theology matters across a number of 
environmental and scientific policy issue areas where humans are in a position to 
modify or alter the perceived created order. This is true for large scale changes in the 
environment and small, but significant, modifications of genetic material. 
Similar to those who oppose climate change, the anti-GMO (genetically 
modified organisms) movement has gained momentum in spite of the scientific 
consensus about the safety of GM foods. Vermont, for example, recently became the 
first state to mandate labels for all foods that contain GMOs. While it lists several 
motivations for the legislation, the law relies heavily on religious preferences to 
justify the labeling of GM foods. The law states, “Vermont citizens with certain 
religious beliefs object to producing foods using genetic engineering because of 
objections to tampering with the genetic makeup of life forms and the rapid 
introduction and proliferation of genetically engineered organisms and, therefore, 




need food to be labeled…” (See H.112, p.7).9  As illustrated by the language of the 
Vermont law, religious belief about creation and the natural order can help drive the 
discourse that contests or dismisses scientific consensus. While the dissertation has 
argued for a connection between theology and climate change attitudes, it is also 
likely the case that end-times theology relates to anti-consensus opinion towards other 
scientific issues like GMOs.  
This chapter uses GMO attitudes to test this argument and contends that end-
times theological beliefs act as the religious determinants of the American public’s 
anti-GMO attitudes. The argument’s premise is that individuals who believe the Earth 
will end sooner, as opposed to later, tend to hold anti-consensus viewpoints because 
of an increased willingness to withdraw from attempted environmental 
improvements. In other words, their opposition to GMOs is part of a larger and 
theologically motivated resistance to human induced changes in natural world. 
Additionally, individuals who believe the Earth will end due to supernatural causes, 
such as the Second Coming of Jesus, are particularly likely to believe the Earth will 
end sooner and then translate their beliefs into opposition to modification.  This 
chapter tests a new measure of the concept of the Shadow of the Future, which refers 
to beliefs about shorter time horizons for when the Earth will end. Additionally, the 
chapter tests an original measurement for individual end-times beliefs, which asks 
respondents whether they believe religious or non-religious factors will lead to the 
                                                            
9 The full text of each law is available online: http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2014/bills/Passed/H-
112.pdf 




end of the Earth.  These measures allow for the test of the claims in the chapter using 
a 2014 statewide survey. 
  
Why eschatology?  
Among religious believers, eschatology provides a time horizon after which 
human effort is replaced by direct divine action in the destruction and/or recreation of 
the earth. Eschatology is broadly defined as a system of beliefs about the end of time. 
Previous definitions have outlined Christian eschatology as “end-times believers hold 
that Jesus will one day return to Earth and commence a series of events (e.g., the 
Rapture, Tribulation, and Millennial reign of Christ) that will eventually culminate in 
a final battle between good and evil (Armageddon)” (Barker and Bearce 2013, 268). 
As religious historians note, Christians diverge over the sequence of events, but most 
popular in the United States is that of premillennialism, where Jesus will return before 
or during the wars, famines, and other trials of the Tribulation to take Christians from 
the earth in the Rapture. Premillennialism thus creates a sense of otherworldliness in 
some Christians since they will not be around for the destruction and rebirth of the 
earth that occurs after Armageddon (Marsden 2006; Barker and Bearce 2013; Guth et 
al. 1993). It fits into a larger system of eschatology known as dispensationalism, 
which is a critical element along with biblical literalism in Christian Fundamentalism.  
Historically, fundamentalism morphed into evangelicalism, but the theological 
undercurrent of dispensationalism continues. Studies have shown that fundamentalist 




theological beliefs have a profound impact on how religious influences other areas 
where the public expresses anti-consensus opinions such as climate science.   
Early work, for instance, found that “end times thinking” has powerful effects 
on opposition to regulatory environmental policy (Guth et al. 1995, 1993). More 
recent work concludes that both fundamentalism and eschatology predict support for 
environmental attitudes, and do so in specific policy realms. American opinion was 
more favorable toward regulatory domestic policy but decidedly unfavorable towards 
global or international policy (Chaudoin, Smith, and Urpelainen 2013).10  While 
useful, these studies are limited by a lack of true eschatological measures, relying 
instead on a combination of religious measures to test their claims.  
Drawing on more nuanced measures of eschatological beliefs, Barker and 
Bearce sought to correct this omission by examining why and how eschatological 
beliefs affected mass opinion on environmental policy attitudes (Barker and Bearce 
2013). Borrowing from the game theoretic work on the shadow of the future (Bearce, 
Floros, and McKibben 2009) they find that eschatology shortens the “shadow of the 
future” among religious believers and decreases their willingness to support 
regulatory policy. In agreement with earlier work, they also find that eschatology has 
powerful direct effects on regulatory policy attitudes (Barker and Bearce 2013).  
                                                            
10 This is a brief look at the otherwise rich literature on religion and environmentalism. Other notable 
studies have found powerful influence by religious beliefs and religious elites on mass opinion about 
environmentalism. However, most of these studies have focused on the dominion-stewardship divide 
or the mass-elite interaction (White 1967; Hand and Van Liere 1984; Eckberg and Blocker 1989, 1996; 
Sherkat and Ellison 2007; Djupe and Hunt 2009; Djupe and Olson 2010; Djupe and Gwiasda 2010). 




While an improvement over past analyses, their argument is limited by their measure 
of beliefs in end-time horizons, which does not offer any variation in time horizon 
options from which a respondent can choose. This causes us to question the validity 
of the current time horizon measures since they potentially leave uncaptured the 
variation in perceived time horizons of the End of the Earth. 
 While this chapter offers an improvement in new measures of end-times 
theology and time horizons, eschatology itself is not a foreign concept to political 
science outside of the realm of religion and politics. It is related to both the shadow of 
future found in game theory approaches and the well-known work on sociotropic 
horizons in public opinion.  Opinion researchers have suggested that in addition to 
personal well-being, individuals evaluate politicians and policy options with the 
questions of “what have you for the country lately?” and “what are you likely to do 
for the country in the future?” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 156; MacKuen, Erikson, 
and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 
2008). While these studies have tended to focus on the relationship between 
economics and public opinion, religious beliefs can create an alternative sociotropic 
calculus, where political opinions are evaluated not in terms of economic gains or 
benefits, but their utility given religiously pre-determined time horizon. 
 This chapter applies the lessons learned from religion and environmentalism 
and uses eschatology to test how religiously inspired time horizons influence public 
opinion that diverges from the scientific recommendation, such is the case with anti-
GMO opinion. This results in the following expectations expressed at hypotheses: 




• Hypothesis 1 (H1) -  Shadow of the Future:  Shorter time horizons will relate 
positively with anti-GMO attitudes, as part of the withdrawal that short SOF 
respondents have from environmental improvements.  
• Hypothesis 2 (H2)- Supernatural Causes: Those who believe the world’s end 
is the result of supernatural causes, such as the Second Coming of Jesus, will 
be more willing to express GMO opposition than those who offer less 
religious reasons for the end of the world.  
• Hypothesis 3 (H3)-  Religiously inspired Time Horizons: Time horizons will 
likely be religiously inspired, meaning that respondents who believe in 
supernatural end-times theology will positively relate their shorter time 
horizons to anti-GMO attitudes. Essentially, this tests whether the religiously 
conceived “Shadow of the Future,” e.g., shortened Time Horizons, relates 
more significantly to scientific attitudes than non-religious interpretations of 
end-times.  
 
Data and Method: 
To test the hypotheses, this chapter relies on data from a survey fielded by 
researchers at a Midwestern university in the weeks preceding the 2014 midterm 
elections. The sample matches the Census proportions on income, educational 
attainment, African American identification, Democratic partisan identification, and 
liberal ideological self-placement. Compared to the American public in 2015, the 
Midwestern respondents appeared more conservative (51% compared to 38%) and 




Republican (36% compared to 23%) on average (Pew 2015). The state survey also 
diverged from the national demographics on the proportion of women, with only 44 
percent female respondents, compared to 51 percent nationally (US Census 2014). 
The statewide sample mirrors national polls on the question of whether GMO foods 
are “bad” (Pew 2015). The variable descriptions and question wordings are as 
follows: 
• Anti-GMO attitudes are measured from a question about whether altering 
foods could harm human health and the environment. (good 45%; bad 55%). 
• Time Horizons attitudes are a question about when the Earth will likely end 
(1=later, beyond humanity’s existence; 2=during humanity’s existence; 3=in 
my grandchildren’s lifetime; 4=in my kids’ lifetime; 5=sooner, during my 
lifetime). 
• Supernatural Causes attitudes are agreement that supernatural causes, such 
as the Second Coming of Jesus, will cause the End of the world (46.6%). 
• Human Causes attitudes are agreement that the end of the world will be the 
result of human causes. (27%). 
• Natural Causes attitudes are agreement that the end of the world will be the 
result of natural causes, such as a meteor hitting the Earth (16.6%) 
• Religiosity is based on a question of how often they attend religious services 
(1=never; 2=seldom; 3=a few times a year; 4=once or twice a month; 5=once 
a week; 6=more than once a week; mean=3.96). 




• Biblical literalism is increasing agreement that the Bible is the literal word of 
God (1-3; mean=2.29). 
• Ideology is measured using a branching question about how liberal 
respondents were on a 5-point scale, from strongly conservative to strongly 
liberal. (mean=2.56) 
• Female is self-identification as a woman. (Male 56%; Female 44%) 
• Income is categorical with 1 indicating respondents with household incomes 
of less than $25,000, 2 indicating incomes between $25,000-$50,000, 3 for 
$50,000-$75,000, 4 $75,000-$100,000, and 5 More than $100,000. 
(mean=3.14) 
• Education is a scale with 1 indicating less than a high school education, 2 for 
some high school, 3 high school graduate, 4 vocational/ training school, 5 
some college, 6 college degree, and 6 post-graduate degree. (mean=4.89) 
 
This chapter next features a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to 
examine religion’s relationship with anti-consensus public opinion on the scientific 
issue of genetically modified foods. The main theological expectations are tested 
against alternative religious explanations based on Biblical literalism and religious 
service attendance variables.  The results suggest preliminary support for the 
hypotheses, although more research is needed due to the current study’s data 
limitations.   
 





The analysis begins by first comparing the mean time horizons expressed by 
groups who believe in different causes of end-times: supernatural; human; and 
natural. Each group’s mean time horizon is measured on a scale of 1, belief the world 
will end later after human existence, to 5, the belief that the world will end soon—in 
the respondent’s own lifetime. The average time horizon stated by all respondents 
was 2.27 out of 5 (n=324), with the majority 55% of respondents claiming that the 
Earth will end in humanity’s lifetime, and just a minority 11% believing the Earth 
will end in either their own lifetime or their children’s lifetimes. Overall, the 
comparisons indicate that respondents generally believe the Earth will end later rather 
than sooner, and reveal a significant relationship between beliefs about shorter time 
horizons and the perceived causes of end-times (X-squared=15.56; p=0.016). 
  
Table 5-1: Mean Beliefs about How Soon the Earth Will End, By Perceived Cause 
 Mean (1-5) N 
Supernatural Causes 2.52 142 
Human Causes 2.33 100 
Natural Causes 1.67 63 
Note: 1=beyond humanity’s existence; 2= in humanity’s existence; 3= in my 
grandkids’ lifetime; 4= in my kids’ lifetime; 5= in my lifetime.  
 
Table 5.1 shows that most respondents in the sample believed that the Earth 
will end after everyone they have known on Earth has passed away, meaning during 
humanity’s existence but neither soon enough to happen during their grandchildren’s 
lifetimes nor late enough to happen after human existence. The overall time horizon 




mean of the sample thus points to a general perception that the end of the Earth will 
not occur for some time. 
It also reflects the finding that most people who believe the world will end in 
their or their children’s lifetime are divided on why they believe this to be true.  The 
largest proportion are Supernatural thinkers, which is reflected in the highest group 
mean of 2.52 out of 5 on the time horizon scale. The respondents who have the 
shortest time horizon hold to a Natural Causes interpretation of end-times (1.67 out of 
5), with the Human Cause group falling somewhere in between the two (2.33 out of 
5). This simple finding is important since it tells us that individual time horizons may 
or may not have religious interpretations undergirding them. The findings also reveal 
that perceptions of shorter time horizons positively relate with Supernatural 
interpretations of the end-times, and yet there are also differences between Human 
Cause and Natural Cause interpretations. This provides some description of the main 
independent variables of the analysis but leaves unexamined their relationship to the 
main dependent variable. 
Table 5.2 addresses the relationship between time horizons and anti-GMO 
attitudes.  As we move down the table from the respondents with the longest time 
horizon to the shortest time horizon, opposition to GMOs increases from a mean 
response of 2.35 to 3.33 (out of 4). This means that those who believe the Earth’s end 
will occur “beyond humanity” start with the “somewhat disagreement” that GMOs 
are “bad,” which changes to “somewhat agreement” for those who believe that the 
world will end during their or their children’s lifetimes.  This relationship is 




substantively interesting, and approaches statistical significance (X-square= 20.23; 
p=0.06).  It suggests that GMO opposition might be related to shortened time 
horizons, providing partial confirmation to H1. A similar test comparing GMO 
opposition levels to end-times theology based on Supernatural Causes proves 
insignificant and fails to support H2. In other words, believing in Supernatural causes 
for the end of the world does not directly predict belief about GMOs. Despite the lack 
of a direct relationship between Supernatural theology and anti-GMO attitudes, there 
is still the possibility of an indirect influence of theology through the time horizons 
variable, as claimed in H3. 
 
Table 5-2: GMO Opposition, by Respondent’s Time Horizon for End of Earth 
 Mean (1-4) N 




During grandkids’ lifetime 2.57 30 
During my kids’ lifetime 3.14 21 
In my lifetime 3.33 18 
Note: GMO opposition variable is based on a question about whether respondents 
agree with the that GMOs are “bad.” 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 
3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree.  
 
 
In order to test H3, the analysis compares split sample multivariate analysis 
according to the Supernatural and Human end-times theologies. If H3 is correct, it is 
expected that a positive relationship from the time horizon variable labeled “The 
Earth will end sooner” in Table 5-3. It would not be expected for the time horizon 
variable to produce a significantly positive result for the Human Causes model, since 




it is not religiously inspired.  Again, this is because those who believe in the end-
times are religiously inspired and are expected to oppose anthropogenic modification 
to the natural order in a way that the non-religiously inspired are not. 
 
Table 5-3: The Relationship Between End Times Theology & GMO Opposition 
 Supernatural 
causes Human causes Full Model 
 
The Earth will end 


















































































Note. How beliefs about the end of the world relate anti-GMO attitudes, in 
terms of how soon the world will end as well as beliefs about Armageddon’s 
cause ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 
  
The findings from the analysis are displayed in Table 5-3 and confirm the 
expectation about the religiously inspired nature of shortened time horizons.  The 
Supernatural Causes model is the only end-times specification that results in a 




significant and positive result for the shortened time horizon variable. Interpreting the 
split sample analysis shows that those who believe in Supernatural causes and have 
an increasingly shorter time horizon (the Earth with end) are increasingly likely to 
oppose GMOs (0.43***). It is clear though, that, apocalyptic thinking does not affect 
GMO opposition if one believes in Human causes for the end of the world (0.06). 
Thus, theologically inspired eschatology and religiously motivated end-times thinking 
increases opposition, even if indirectly, to human modifications of the natural world. 
Caution is used when interpreting the finding due to the small sample sizes.  
However, it merits further research given that the theological measures in this study 
produce significant results across bivariate and multivariate analyses alike. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown partial evidence in favor of a theological explanation 
to anti-consensus attitudes about scientific policy issues. The time horizon measures 
and theological end-times conceptualizations tend to outperform other religious 
variables in multivariate tests. While Biblical literalism and religiosity do not relate to 
anti-GMO attitudes in any significant or meaningful way for the respondents in this 
chapter, Supernatural causes for the end of the world and shorter time horizons 
increase opposition to genetic modification by humans.  Despite this finding, the 
interpretation of the results remains merely speculative at this point, given the early 
stage of this research’s development.   




Still, this initial test does illustrate several interesting measurement 
considerations for those interested in examining eschatology in future studies. For 
example, it is clear that new measures should be developed to take into account the 
various ways in which Americans claim the world will end.  Previous work 
interpreted agreement with the Second Coming as evidence of both a time horizon 
and a Supernatural interpretation of theology.  However, this chapter shows that those 
are distinct concepts and should not share the same indicators. Future researchers 
should specifically relate such measures with statements about the world’s end in 
order to better capture the concept of end-times theology.  It is also recommended 
that more precise attempts at measuring the “Shadow of the Future” be made. Finally, 
future research should improve upon the theory and measures to allow for 
respondents to be able to voice reasonable time estimations without large rates of 
non-response. Much research has yet to be completed, and the relationship between 
religion and anti-consensus attitudes remains unclear. However, the preliminary 
deployment of the end-times measures does suggest that theology about the natural 
world plays a role in shaping opinion about scientific issues. While this was 
unfortunately not applied to climate change the measure provides a step forward for 
research building on the existing claims of eschatology tied to literalism. Notably, 
that literalism and eschatology are not necessary synonymous, as previous chapters 
demonstrated with dominion and literalism.  




Chapter 6 : Conclusion 
Introduction: 
This journey began by asking relatively simple questions.  What is the 
relationship between humanity and nature?  How does religion conceptualize this 
relationship?  What does this mean for politics and public policy?  By looking at 
stated beliefs from religious organizations, talking with clergy, and analyzing survey 
responses, partial answers to these questions emerge and a new path of exploration is 
revealed. 
 
What is the relationship between humanity and nature? 
In chapter two, official statements from religious organizations about climate 
change were examined for key themes and categories. These statements, known as 
position papers, showed that Christian religious denominations varied in how they 
used scriptural and scientific evidence to speak about climate change and global 
warming. From a close reading of the position papers, it also became clear that many 
Christian groups view their approach towards nature in terms of stewardship. 
However, there is variation around how stewardship is defined.  As opposed to a 
clean dominion-stewardship divide, the fault line between religious groups was found 
between resource-management centered approaches and more preservationist 
approaches.  This finding upsets previous understandings about dominion and human 
rule over nature (White 1967) and shows that religiously-motivated environmental 
stewardship is multi-dimensional.  




The position statements showed that religious organizations seemed to use 
differences in describing stewardship to signify two different theologies of nature. As 
such, stewardship-as-resource-management and stewardship-as-preservation became 
the main categories used to describe theologies of nature. A rough definition of these 
differences is that resource-management is human-centered while preservation is non-
human centered. Applying theology to politics, theologies of nature ask if Christian 
stewardship is directed at managing nature so it can be used productively for human 
purposes or does it mean preserving and tending to earth as a caretaker?  
Using these theologies of nature as a foundation, the third, fourth, and fifth 
chapters used survey and interview data to analyze whether the distinct types of 
stewardship resonated with clergy and congregants.  
Chapter three contained interviews with clergy which asked questions about 
the relationship between humans and nature. Clergy seemed to organically speak in 
terms of stewardship anchored in resource-management or preservation.  Contrary to 
the White thesis, dominion seems to have virtually vanished from the theological 
discourse.  For nearly all the Christian clergy, this stemmed from passages early in 
the Bible such as the creation narrative in Genesis. In Christian scripture, the 
universe, earth, and all life are created over the course of seven days. Animals are 
made on the sixth day and the Bible says that "Then God said, "Let us make 
humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over 
the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the 
wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." 




(Gen 1.26, NRSV). Clergy expressed that differences over how they interpreted 
"rule" influenced the type of stewardship they supported. 
Chapter four used mass survey data of residents in Oklahoma to explore how 
religion influences belief on climate change, uncertainty about climate change, and 
possible risk from climate change. The survey showed that just over half of 
respondents believed that climate change was happening. Drilling down to look at 
religion, the chapter showed religious affiliation is not reliably predictive of climate 
change opinion. With the rise of the "nones" and increasing detachment from 
denominations, it should not be too surprising that religious affiliation and belonging 
show weak predictive power (“America’s Changing Religious Landscape” 2015; 
Schwadel 2013). If the trend continues, researchers will need to continue to adapt and 
find innovative ways to measure key religious blocs, such a theologically-informed 
questioning of political values and attitudes.   
Moving beyond belonging, using specific religious beliefs seemed more 
insightful. The well-established measure of literalism seemed to underperform, but 
that may be due to using specific questions to get at the theological assumptions 
behind literalism.  In other words, while biblical literalism can be used to indicate a 
certain theological disposition, it may not accurately represent specific theologies 
related to nature or environmentalism. As a result, in the survey literalism behaved 
much like other religious affiliation measures and did not reliably predict opinion on 
climate change when other factors, like political ideology or the New Environmental 
Paradigm, were considered. Asking respondents if "humans should rule over nature" 




seemed to get at one of the core reasons scholars use literalism as a variable on 
surveys: the assumption that literalists are creationists and by extension, dominionist. 
However, asking the question directly was consistently predictive and theoretically 
parsimonious. Furthermore, using the question from the NEP battery provides further 
researchers with a commonly used way to assess environmental beliefs.   
Much of current religion and climate research has focused on climate change 
and trade-offs for climate change policy against economic policy and then correlating 
these values with religious belonging, believing, or behaving. In this dissertation, two 
new variables are introduced due to the uniqueness of the data; certainty and risk. 
Literalism did help to predict certainty about climate change and risk from climate 
change. In both cases, literalists had a relatively low sense of certainty about climate 
change not happening and they saw a low level of risk from climate change. 
Chapter five expanded the scope of the dissertation and showed how 
theologies of nature may matter in other environmental and scientific policy issue 
areas. Using unique and direct questions about end-time thinking (eschatology and 
the Apocalypse), the findings offered suggestive evidence that the shadow of the 
future is related but distinct from biblical literalism. Much as in chapter four, while 
literalism is an important explanatory variable, asking direct theological questions 
offered some additional insight as to the religious motivations behind those who 
might reject areas of consensus science like genetically modified organism or climate 
change. 




Taken together, the data from the clergy interviews and the mass surveys 
suggests that religious believers ground support for climate change and related issues 
in their theology. While the question is still open about which comes first – theology 
or political opinion – the theology of nature expressed by the clergy seems consistent 
and like those found in the mass survey. Those who believe that humans are not 
meant to rule over nature view stewardship as in terms of preservation, express higher 
belief that climate change is happening, are more certain that it is happening, and 
perceive a higher risk from climate change than those who lean towards stewardship 
as resource management. 
  
How do religious groups conceptualize nature? 
One important question raised by this dissertation was "how do religious 
groups conceptualize nature"? Much has been written about this from a religious or 
philosophical perspective. However, the aim here was to focus on political and public 
policy research. Most relevant to that discussion are the concepts of cosmology and 
eschatology, or creation and the end of the world. 
Returning to definitions from the first chapter, research involving religion and 
creation usually used by political researchers refers to the Christian idea of a literal 
seven-day creation whereby God speaks the universe and life into existence. 
Eschatology, on the other hand, refers to how the world ends and is the culmination 
of a series of events from the Bible leading to the eventual remaking of the physical 
world. Both definitions of cosmology and eschatology are more prominent and strict 




among evangelical and fundamental wings of Christianity and more flexible with 
Mainline, Catholic, or Orthodox wings. Translating these ideas to other religions can 
be very difficult. For example, in clergy interviews, one conservative Jewish rabbi 
mentioned that traditional Jewish belief does not see the afterlife in the same terms as 
Christians, thus, Christian eschatology was meaningless. Thus, the findings from the 
dissertation are limited to Christians. 
Between looking at position papers, interviewing clergy, and analyzing the 
mass survey, the study found that cosmology seemed to resonate more with 
respondents than eschatology. Looking back through the position papers, nearly all 
mentioned being stewards or caretakers of God's creation. However, only one 
denomination of the twelve denominations analyzed specifically used an eschatology 
as a reason not to be concerned about global warming or climate change policy. 
Clergy interviewed responded similarly and nearly all spoke about God's role in 
creating the earth and how that should influence the human relationship with nature. 
However, most of the clergy rejected the idea that Christian eschatology would lead 
Christians to not care about climate change or environmental policy. In most cases, 
the rejection of eschatology was because of the expectations on humans as stewards 
and caretakers set by creation. The results from the mass survey in chapter three are 
not necessarily applicable here since the survey did not have direct questions on 
cosmology or eschatology. However, some conclusions based on chapter two and 
chapter four can be made. 




Previous research has used literalism as a proxy for cosmology or 
eschatology. The tentative findings from the dissertation suggest that religious 
believers, at least at the elite level, may not conceptualize literalism, cosmology, and 
eschatology in a way to make this assumption valid. Instead, future research might 
benefit from asking about the three categories of belief directly. This avenue of 
research is not without challenges though. In three previous attempts, I tried to use 
explicitly eschatological questions to evaluate scientific policy and environmental 
policy opinion. One attempt was a state-level mass survey while the other two were 
targeted at clergy. In all three attempts, the response rate for the eschatological 
questions was low enough to make analysis difficult. Yet, even with less than ideal 
response rates for the questions, eschatology was somewhat predictive in opinion 
about scientific and environmental policy issue areas such as genetically modified 
organisms or global warming. National level surveys have also shown some success 
at getting responses to eschatology questions and using that data to better understand 
opinion about natural disasters (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2014). Thus, 
while a road less traveled, asking direct questions about cosmology and eschatology 
is an available path for future research. 
 
What does this mean for politics and public policy? 
When this study began, I sought to pull together theories from public opinion, 
religion and politics, and public policy to explore how religion influences the politics 
around climate change, environment, and other scientific issue areas. Through a 




detailed study of clergy and the mass public in a sole case study, some suggestive 
findings for the discipline at large emerged. 
For public opinion, the diversity among and within religious groups is not 
necessarily a failure of elites to hold the group together nor does it indicate that 
citizens are incoherent. Rather, it shows that religious believers marshal available 
theologies of nature to inform or justify their position on climate change and that 
similar scriptures can be used to justify vastly different political preferences and 
policy positions. This continues to challenge the theories of Converse and Zaller and 
suggests that elites and individuals may have fixed opinions and these opinions may 
be rooted in religious knowledge and not political or economic knowledge (Converse 
1964; Zaller 1992). Additional work is necessary to determine if these differences are 
due to factors such as motivated reasoning, psychological predisposition, or political 
ideology and loyalties (Hart and Nisbet 2012; Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, and Braman 
2011; Kahan 2013). 
For religion and politics, using literalism as a proxy for other specific 
theological beliefs is tempting but ultimately hides more than it reveals. Contrary to 
previous scholarship (Guth et al. 1993, 1995; Chaudoin, Smith, and Urpelainen 
2013), using direct questioning may provide better insight into the political theology 
used to justify political attitudes or opinion (Barker and Bearce 2013). Additionally, 
the growing weight of evidence suggests that the Lynn White thesis and the 
stewardship-dominion dichotomy does not exist in the language used by religious 
denominations and the clergy and who represent them.  




Relatedly, the organizational structure of denominations and churches seems to 
impact the reach of political signaling from denominations and clergy. Clergy seemed 
acutely aware of their position in the hierarchy and their ability to influence their 
individual congregations. This supports the continuing work of religion and politics 
scholars who are moving beyond mass survey and individual public opinion to focus 
on clergy and congregational influences (Calfano, Oldmixon, and Suiter 2013; Gilbert 
and Djupe 2009). 
For public policy, the results are less clear. While there are several theories of 
the policy process, only two are mentioned in the dissertation. These are the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). 
The ACF focuses on the coalitions of actors that form around certain policy issues 
and the shared beliefs and preferences that hold those coalitions together (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The use of Cultural Theory 
earlier in the dissertation comes from the ACF's attempt to define and identify the 
belief systems which bind coalitions together. It is from Cultural Theory that 
questions on egalitarianism, fatalism, and hierarchism, individualism, where drawn 
for use in the quantitative analysis in chapter three. Unfortunately, for the ACF, there 
are more questions than answers in this project. The specific interaction between 
Cultural Theory and religious belief systems remains to be mapped. However, in the 
initial exploration of biblical literalism and Cultural Theory, literalism had an 
independent effect on respondents apart from the four types of deep core beliefs in 
Cultural Theory. This is suggestive that religious belief is not necessarily captured by 




Cultural Theory even if there is an interaction between the two types of belief system. 
Yet, this is a tentative finding and should be explored in further follow-up. 
Commonly used alongside the ACF is the NPF. The Narrative Policy Framework 
(NPF) examines the narrative and rhetoric used to support or oppose a policy and the 
micro and macro levels where that narrative is deployed (M. D. Jones and McBeth 
2010). What emerged out of this dissertation were two theologies of nature, 
stewardship as resource management and stewardship as preservation, which 
religious organizations, elites, and individuals used to justify their position on climate 
change. Notably, for organizations and elites, these same theologies of nature were 
used to defend and promote concrete environmental policy action. Additionally, even 
if the two theologies of nature were associated with different policy positions, there 
was substantial overlap on basic definitions of stewardship and appropriate action. 
For example, all the clergy expressed support for local recycling and many of the 
denominations praised the use of alternative energy for helping vulnerable 
populations. From a more normative position and with the use of the NPF, policy 
makers could carefully use theologies of nature to build and strengthen coalitions to 
support or oppose environmental policy. 
 
Where to go from here? 
Theory, like politics, moves incrementally and this project has attempted to 
move the study of religion and climate one more step forward. Readings of the 
position statements and clergy interviews have shown that the Lynn White approach 




of religion and environment is not sufficiently nuanced to be accurate in a highly 
religious environment. Additionally, moving beyond merely testing literalism to 
include questions on cosmology or eschatology seems to improve the explanative 
power of religion in motivating climate change opinion. Furthermore, clergy seem 
very aware of their ability to influence politics in their congregations but religious 
individuals and religious elites may hold quite different opinions about climate 
change even if they are of the same denomination. Finally, a better understanding of 
the various theologies of nature around stewardship may help to explain the narratives 
used and the conditions formed by religious believers to oppose or support climate 
change policy. 
Despite these initial findings, the nature of the dissertation is suggestive and 
tentative. Questions of sample size with the religious organization position papers and 
the clergy interviews limit the generalizability of the study. This is especially true 
with the clergy interviews. There is also the problem of geographical limitation. 
While the survey used for measuring individual opinion is census matched and 
generalizable for Oklahoma, it may not be representative of a nationwide sample. The 
choice of Oklahoma may have also contributed to the occasionally weak findings 
among biblical literalists since state culture places a high value on conservative 
Christian group membership. The geographical limitation holds for the clergy sample 
as well but not the religious organizations since the position papers came from their 
respective national offices. Nevertheless, the study does create new categories for 
analysis around stewardship and helps to illuminate how clergy conceive their role in 




advocating for theologically motivated environmental policy.  As opposed to being 
the end of this journey, testing these new categories leads into new areas for research. 
By improving scholarly understanding about theologies of nature, researchers will 
better understand the motivations of religious believers, how those motivations 
interact with political beliefs and cueing, and what narratives rally religious believers 
to political action. 
The dissertation also suggests that the use of the mixed-method approaches 
can enhance the study of religion and politics. Through the position papers, clergy 
interviews, and survey responses, I could triangulate differences between types of 
stewardship and how those theological differences might impact attitudes about 
climate change and political and policy preferences for addressing climate change. 
This helped to improve definitions of stewardship and dominion and show the 
boundaries of using literalism as an indicator for nuanced theological concepts. 
Continuing and expanding the mixed-method approach in religion and politics 
research will help with verifying and expounding on the findings from the survey and 
experimental camps of the discipline. 
Returning to the original premise of this dissertation, what of faith and the 
Anthropocene? The question itself carries two meanings. First, do people have faith 
in the Anthropocene? That is, do they believe that humans can change the earth, 
nature, or the climate? This dissertation shows that just over half of all individuals in 
the Oklahoma survey believe that humans can cause climate change. Additionally, the 
religious organizations examined in this dissertation generally agreed that humans 




have a role in changing nature and the global climate. This was true even for 
denominations that opposed aggressive environmental policies. So, tentatively, there 
is faith in the Anthropocene. 
Second, what is the role of faith during the Anthropocene? The answer to this 
question is more complicated, diverse, and I would suggest, substantive. Religious 
denominations and individuals could not come to a consensus over the relationship 
between human and nature. Using theological arguments, they acknowledged that 
ability of humanity to change nature but debated if this was concerning or how they 
should respond. For the faithful living during the Anthropocene, theology matters. 
Religious organizations and individuals use religious thought to justify and explain 
the reasoning for their political and policy preferences. For researchers and 
policymakers, paying attention to the dynamics of theologically-motivated politics 
will continue to remain important. Thus, while there is faith in the Anthropocene, the 
role of faith during the Anthropocene will hinge on if environmental stewardship 
means manager or caretaker.  
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